ORDER MO-4618

Appeal MA22-00194

London Police Services Board

January 21, 2025

Summary: An individual submitted a request to the London Police Services Board (the police) under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act  for records related to a specified incident. The police granted partial access to the records withholding some information.

The police denied access to 911 calls because disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of an identifiable individual’s personal privacy (section 38(b)), and because the information could reveal a confidential source (section 38(a) read with section 8(1)(d)) of the Act . In this order, the adjudicator upholds the police’s decision not to disclose the 911 calls and dismisses the appeal.

Statutes Considered: Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56 , as amended, sections 2(1) (definition of personal information), 14(2)(h), 14(2)(i), 14(3)(b), and 38(b).

OVERVIEW:

[1] An individual made a request to the London Police Services Board (the police) under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act  (the Act ) for all records, including switchboard and 911 audio/video phone calls and all third party information, relating to a specified incident in which they were involved.

[2] The police issued a decision granting partial access to the responsive records withholding information under certain exemptions of the Act .

[3] The appellant appealed the police’s decision to the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) and a mediator was appointed to explore resolution.

[4] During mediation, the appellant confirmed he is only seeking access to any audio recordings of 911 calls responsive to his request and not to any of the other information that the police have withheld.

[5] The police identified the responsive audio recordings of 911 calls, and after notifying an affected party, issued a supplemental decision denying access to the calls under section 38(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information) read with section 8(1)(d) (confidential source of information), and section 38(b) (personal privacy) of the Act .

[6] As no further mediation was possible, the appeal proceeded to the adjudication stage of the appeal process, where an adjudicator may conduct an inquiry under the Act . I commenced an inquiry in which I sought and received representations from the parties about the issues in the appeal.[1] Only one of the two affected parties submitted representations.

[7] In this order, I find that the discretionary section 38(b) personal privacy exemption applies to the audio recordings of the 911 calls, and I uphold the police’s decision not to disclose them.

RECORDS:

[8] The records at issue consist of five audio recordings of 911 calls made by one of the affected parties (911 calls).

ISSUES:

1. Do the 911 calls contain “personal information” as defined in section 2(1) and, if so, whose personal information is it?
2. Does the discretionary personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) apply to the withheld 911 calls?

DISCUSSION:

Issue A: Do the 911 calls contain “personal information” as defined in section 2(1) and, if so, whose personal information is it?

[9] The police claim that the discretionary personal privacy exemptions at section 38(a) and (b) apply to the 911 calls they withheld. For these sections to apply, the IPC must first determine that the record contains “personal information,” and if so, to whom the personal information relates. It is important to know whose personal information is in the record. If the record contains the requester’s own personal information, their access rights are greater than if it does not.[2] Also, if the record contains the personal information of other individuals, one of the personal privacy exemptions might apply. [3]

[10] Section 2(1)  of the Act  gives a list of examples of personal information.[4] The list of examples of personal information under section 2(1) is not a complete list. This means that other kinds of information could also be “personal information.”

[11] To qualify as personal information, it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information is disclosed.[5] ection 2(1) of the Act  defines “personal information” as “recorded information about an identifiable individual.” “Recorded information” is information recorded in any format, such as paper records, electronic records, digital photographs, videos, or maps.[6]

Representations, analysis and findings

[12] After reviewing the 911 calls and the representations of the parties, I find that all the 911 calls contain the personal information of the appellant as well as that of two affected parties, specifically the complainant and a witness.

[13] The police submit that the information at issue contains the personal information of the appellant and the affected parties, specifically addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, gender, places of employment, and statements.

[14] The appellant submits that the records contain his personal information and that of four other individuals, two police officers and the two affected parties involved in the specified incident.

[15] Based on my review of the 911 calls, I find that they contain the personal information of the appellant and the two affected parties from the specified incident, including their sex, address, phone number, their personal views and opinions, and their name along with other information about them. This personal information fits within paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), (g), and (h) of the definition of “personal information” in section 2(1)  of the Act . Furthermore, I find that the 911 calls contain the voice of the complainant, which qualifies as personal information under the Act .

[16] I considered whether the appellant’s personal information could be severed from the 911 calls and disclosed to him. However, based on my review of the 911 calls, I find that most of the appellant’s personal information is inextricably intertwined with that of the affected parties’ and cannot be reasonably severed. Furthermore, even if some portions could be severed, it would result in snippets of meaningless or misleading information, which institutions are not required to release.[7]

Issue B: Does the discretionary personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) apply to the withheld 911 calls?

[17] The police submit that disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls would be an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the affected parties. The appellant’s position is that he is entitled to the 911 calls at issue. The affected party submits that disclosure of the 911 calls would be an invasion of his personal privacy.

[18] Section 36(1)  of the Act  gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides some exemptions from this right.

[19] Under the section 38(b) exemption, if a record contains the personal information of both the requester and another individual, the institution may refuse to disclose the other individual’s personal information to the requester if disclosing that information would be an “unjustified invasion” of the other individual’s personal privacy.

[20] The section 38(b) exemption is discretionary. This means that the institution can decide to disclose another individual’s personal information to a requester even if doing so would result in an unjustified invasion of the other individual’s personal privacy.

[21] If disclosing another individual’s personal information would not be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, then the information is not exempt under section 38(b).

[22] Sections 14(1) to (4) provide guidance in deciding whether disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of another individual’s personal privacy. If any of the section 14(1)(a) to (e) exceptions apply, disclosure would not be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, and the information is not exempt from disclosure under section 38(b). Similarly, if any of the situations in section 14(4) apply, disclosure would not be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under 38(b).

[23] Sections 14(2) and (3) also help in deciding whether disclosure would or would not be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 38(b). If any of sections 14(3)(a) to (h) apply, disclosure of the information is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 38(b). Section 14(2) lists various factors that may be relevant in determining whether disclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.[8] The list of factors is not exhaustive. The institution must also consider circumstances that are relevant, even if they are not listed under section 14(2).[9]

[24] In deciding whether the disclosure of the personal information in the records would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 38(b), I must consider and weigh the factors and presumptions in sections 14(2) and (3) and balance the interests of the parties.[10]

Representations, analysis and findings

[25] Based on my review of the 911 calls and the parties’ representations, I find that the discretionary section 38(b) personal privacy exemption applies to the 911 calls, and they are exempt from disclosure.

[26] The appellant submitted extensive representations and legal documents that relate to the specified incident from the 911 calls, including what appears to be the Crown Brief. In his representations, the appellant makes allegations of hate crimes and rights violations against the police and the affected parties. The appellant’s representations refer to famous basketball players, and he refers to himself as various famous basketball players. He also refers to the Landlord Tenant Board (LTB) and a tenancy matter with one of the affected parties and submitted documents from the LTB. I have reviewed all the appellant’s representations, but I will only refer to those portions of his representations that are most relevant to the issues in this appeal. Allegations against the police and other individuals, and the appellant’s matter with the LTB are outside the scope of this appeal.

[27] The appellant submits that the exceptions in section 14(1)(b) to (e) apply to the 911 calls to permit their disclosure. The police submit that none of the exceptions in sections 14(1)(a) to (e) apply to the 911 calls.

Sections 14(1)(b) to (e) exceptions

14(1)(b): compelling circumstances affecting health or safety

[28] The appellant submits he requires the 911 calls at issue due to his health or safety because his rights have been taken away. Previous IPC orders have held that in order to meet the “compelling” circumstances threshold, the purpose of seeking the personal information at issue must be a matter of “immediate and essential health or safety”.[11] Given that the records are 911 calls about an assault that allegedly took place in 2020, I am not satisfied based on the circumstances of this appeal that the personal information at issue is a matter of immediate and essential health or safety. Therefore, I find that the “compelling” threshold has not been met and the section 14(1)(b) exception does not apply to the 911 calls at issue in this appeal.

14(1)(c): record available to the general public

[29] The appellant submits that the record of his “false arrest” was meant to be public and should be disclosed under the section 14(1)(c) exception. There is no evidence before me that the police collected and maintained the 911 calls at issue specifically for the purpose of creating a record available to the public, as required under section 14(1) (c) of the Act .[12] Therefore, I find that the exception in section 14(1)(c) does not apply to the 911 calls at issue in this appeal.

14(1)(d): another act (law) that expressly authorizes the disclosure

[30] The appellant submits that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  (the Charter ), the Criminal Code of Canada , and the Crown Attorney Act all authorize disclosure of the 911 calls at issue. However, the appellant has not pointed to any specific sections of these acts or explained how they authorize disclosure. Therefore, I find that section 14(1)(d) does not apply.

14(1)(e): research

[31] The appellant also argues that the section 14(1)(e) (research) exception applies to the 911 calls and all the conditions of this section have been met.

[32] The section 14(1)(e) exception only applies if the disclosure of the personal information is for a “research purpose”. If that preliminary requirement is met, the conditions set out in paragraphs (i), (ii), and (iii) of the section must also be satisfied for section 14(1)(e) to apply.[13] Previous IPC orders have adopted the definition of the term “research” from section 2 of the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA), which states:

“research” means a systematic investigation designed to develop or establish principles, facts or generalizable knowledge, or any combination of them, and includes the development, testing and evaluation of research.[14]

[33] Based on this definition, and the appellant’s representations, I find that the appellant is not seeking the withheld information for a “research purpose”, because he is not requesting disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls to conduct a systematic investigation of the nature defined in past IPC orders, but rather for a personal purpose. Accordingly, I find that the section 14(1)(e) exception does not apply to the personal information at issue in the 911 calls.

[34] Neither party has argued that any of the other exceptions in section 14(1) apply to the withheld information, and I find that none apply in the circumstances of this appeal. Since I have found that none of the exceptions at sections 14(1)(a) to (e) apply, I must consider and weigh any section 14(2) factors and section 14(3) presumptions that apply.

Section 14(3)(b) presumption: investigation into a possible violation of law

[35] The police argue that the section 14(3)(b) presumption applies to the personal information in the 911 calls because it was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, which resulted in criminal charges against the appellant.[15]

[36] The appellant agrees that the section 14(3)(b) presumption applies if “a shove or a bump” is considered assault.

[37] Section 14(3)(b) states:

A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy if the personal information, was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation[.]

[38] Based on my review of the personal information in the 911 calls, I am satisfied that it was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law. The personal information at issue is contained in recordings of 911 calls. Even if no criminal proceedings were commenced against an individual, section 14(3)(b) may still apply. The presumption only requires that there be an investigation into a possible violation of law,[16] and I am satisfied that a police investigation took place, which resulted in criminal charges against the appellant. Therefore, I find that the personal information in the 911 calls is subject to section 14(3)(b) and its disclosure is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the affected parties.

[39] The police submit that none of the section 14(4) exceptions apply in the circumstances of this appeal. The appellant argues that the exceptions in section 14(4) apply to the 911 calls. However, his representations list the exceptions in section 14(1) instead of the ones in section 14(4) and he did not specify which section 14(4) exception apply and why. From my review of the section 14(4) exceptions, I find that none of them apply in the circumstances of this appeal.

[40] Under section 38(b), the presumptions in section 14(3) must be weighed and balanced with any factors in section 14(2) that are relevant. The appellant argues that the factors at sections 14(2)(a) (public scrutiny), 14(2)(b) (public health and safety), 14(2)(c) (purchase of goods and services), and 14(2)(d) (fair determination of rights) apply to the withheld information. These factors weigh in favour of disclosure, if they are found to apply.[17]

[41] The police argue that the factors at sections 14(2)(f) (highly sensitive) and 14(2)(h) (supplied in confidence) apply to the withheld information. These factors weigh against disclosure, if they are found to apply.

[42] Sections 14(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), and (h) state:

14(2) A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether,

(a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the institution to public scrutiny;

(b) access to the personal information may promote public health and safety;

(c) access to the personal information will promote informed choice in the purchase of goods and services;

(d) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of rights affecting the person who made the request;

(f) the personal information is highly sensitive;

(h) the personal information has been supplied by the individual to whom the information relates in confidence

Section 14(2) factors favouring disclosure

[43] The appellant argues that sections 14(2)(a) (public scrutiny) and 14(2)(b) (public health and safety) apply, because disclosure of the 911 calls would reveal racism, negligence, false 911 calls, hate crimes, and a false arrest perpetrated by the police and the affected parties, which would protect the public.

[44] Based on the circumstances of this appeal, I find that these factors do not apply to weigh in favour of disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls. Section 14(2)(a) contemplates disclosure to subject the activities of the government, as opposed to the views or actions of private individuals, to public scrutiny.[18] The records are 911 calls made by one of the affected parties to the police and only contain his views and actions. Therefore, I am not persuaded that disclosure of this personal information would subject the activities of the police to greater public scrutiny under section 14(2)(a).

[45] Section 14(2)(b) is a factor favouring disclosure if disclosure of the information may protect public health and safety. Previous IPC orders have held that this factor applies in favour of disclosure of personal information in contexts such as the name of a dog owner, whose dog bites or attacks another person, because it may promote public health and safety.[19] However, in the circumstances of this appeal, I find that disclosure of the 911 calls would not promote public health and safety as contemplated by section 14(2) (b) of the Act .[20] While the appellant argues that disclosure of the 911 calls would promote public health and safety, he has not established how disclosure of the personal information of the affected parties in the 911 calls specifically would do so.

[46] Accordingly, I find that the factors at sections 14(2)(a) and (b) do not apply to weigh in favour of the disclosure of the 911 calls.

[47] The appellant argues that section 14(2)(c) (purchase of goods and services) applies, because disclosure of the 911 calls would reveal the activities of the businesses associated with the affected parties. For section 14(2)(c) to apply in this appeal, disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls would have to promote the informed choice in the purchase of goods and services. Based on my review of the 911 calls, I am not satisfied that their disclosure would assist in the making of an informed choice about the purchase of goods and services. The personal information contained in the 911 calls do not relate to the businesses associated with the affected parties but to a specified incident of an alleged assault. Therefore, I find that the section 14(2)(c) factor does not apply to weigh in favour of disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls.

[48] The appellant argues that the factor in section 14(2)(d) applies, because the personal information in the 911 calls is relevant to the fair determination of his rights. He states that a false police report, a false arrest, and false 911 calls were made. He further states that his Charter  rights have been violated.

[49] For the factor at section 14(2)(d) to apply in favour of disclosure, the appellant must establish all four parts of the following test:

1. the right in question is a legal right which is drawn from the concepts of common law or statute law, as opposed to a non-legal right based solely on moral or ethical grounds; and
2. the right is related to a proceeding which is either existing or contemplated, not one which has already been completed; and
3. the personal information which the appellant is seeking access to has some bearing on or is significant to the determination of the right in question; and
4. the personal information is required in order to prepare for the proceeding or to ensure an impartial hearing.[21]

[50] The appellant has argued that the personal information in the 911 calls is required for the fair determination of his rights. From his representations, it appears that he is requesting the personal information, because he believes that the police have violated his Charter  rights. The appellant has not filed a Notice of Constitutional Question with the IPC and the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario; nor has he requested any specific remedy under the Charter  in this appeal under the Act .

[51] Based on the evidence before me, I am not persuaded by the appellant’s representations that section 14(2)(d) applies to the personal information at issue in this appeal.

[52] Although the appellant has raised a constitutional issue, I find that it is insufficiently particularized. He neither identifies any particular sections of Charter  that might be affected by the police’s failure to disclose the personal information at issue, nor does he provide detailed submissions about his generalized claim.

[53] The information in the 911 calls contain primarily the personal information of the affected parties involved in the alleged incident of assault, including the complainant and a witness. The appellant has not explained how the personal information that he is seeking access to has some bearing on or is significant to the determination of a legal right under the Charter  or otherwise. He also has not provided evidence to demonstrate that the personal information is required in order to prepare for an existing or contemplated proceeding or is required to ensure an impartial hearing. Given this, it is unclear from the appellant’s representations how disclosure of the personal information is significant to or required for the fair determination of his rights for the purposes of parts three and four of the test in section 14(2) (d) of the Act .

[54] I also note that the police’s withholding of the 911 calls at issue in this appeal does not prevent the appellant from pursuing other legal remedies that might be available to him with respect to his allegations against the police.[22]

[55] Therefore, I find that the appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to establish the application of either the third or the fourth part of the test. For section 14(2)(d) to apply, all four parts of the test must be established. Since the appellant has not persuaded me that all four parts of the section 14(2)(d) test have been met, I find that section 14(2)(d) does not apply to weigh in favour of the disclosure of the 911 calls at issue in this appeal.

Section 14(2) factors weighing against disclosure

[56] The police argue that the section 14(2)(f) (highly sensitive) factor applies to weigh against disclosure of the 911 calls in this appeal. In order for section 14(2)(f) to apply, the personal information at issue must be considered to be highly sensitive, which means there must be a reasonable expectation of significant personal distress if the information were disclosed.[23]

[57] The police argue that the personal information in the 911 calls is highly sensitive because it belongs to a complainant and witness in a police investigation. The police submit that the IPC has previously found that the disclosure of the personal information of witnesses, complainants, or suspects in a police investigation could reasonably be expected to cause these individuals significant personal distress, and therefore, such information may be considered highly sensitive. Generally, the affected party submits that it would cause him distress if the 911 calls were disclosed to the appellant.

[58] Given that the withheld information contains the personal information of the complainant and witness to an alleged incident of assault, in keeping with previous orders of the IPC,[24] I find that its disclosure to the appellant could reasonably be expected to cause significant personal distress to the individuals to whom the personal information relates. Therefore, I find that section 14(2)(f) applies in this appeal and weighs against disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls.

[59] The police argue that the section 14(2)(h) (supplied in confidence) factor applies to weigh against disclosure of the 911 calls, because the personal information in them, was supplied in confidence. The police submit that when individuals and witnesses provide information to the police, there is an expectation that it will remain confidential. The police submit that they must maintain the trust bestowed upon them by protecting the personal information obtained during investigations.

[60] As past orders have established, section 14(2)(h) applies if both the individual supplying the information and the recipient had an expectation that the information would be treated confidentially, and that expectation is reasonable in the circumstances. Section 14(2)(h) requires an objective assessment of the reasonableness of any confidentiality expectation.[25]

[61] I find that section 14(2)(h) applies in the circumstances of this appeal and weighs against disclosure of the 911 calls. The personal information at issue is contained in 911 calls made by the complainant of an alleged assault. In my view, in the context of this appeal, a reasonable person would expect that the information the affected party supplied to the police would be kept confidential. Based on my review of the 911 calls and the representations of the parties, I am satisfied that the personal information was provided in circumstances where there was a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Therefore, I find that the factor in section 14(2)(h) applies to the personal information in the 911 calls and weighs against its disclosure.

[62] As noted above, the appellant’s representations make several allegations against the police related to their conduct in the investigation, subsequent trial, and his access request under the Act . I considered whether these allegations qualify as an unlisted factor weighing in favour of disclosure of the 911 calls, and I find that they do not. I also considered whether any other unlisted factors favouring disclosure, such as inherent fairness issues, apply, and I find that none apply in the circumstances of this appeal.

[63] Overall, I have found that no section 14(2) factors weigh in favour of disclosure and that the factors at sections 14(2)(f) (highly sensitive) and 14(2)(h) (supplied in confidence) weigh against disclosure. I have also found that the section 14(3)(b) presumption against disclosure applies to the personal information at issue. Balancing the interests of the parties, the facts of this appeal weigh against disclosure of the personal information in the 911 calls. Therefore, I find that the 911 calls are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the discretionary exemption at section 38 (b) of the Act .

Absurd result

[64] The appellant’s representations suggest that he believes that the records should be disclosed to him because he already knows the identity of the complainant and the witness whose personal information appears in the 911 calls. As a result, I will consider the possible application of the “absurd result principle.”

[65] The absurd result principle may apply where the appellant originally supplied the information at issue or is otherwise aware of it. Where circumstances are present, the information may not be exempt under section 38(b) because withholding the information might be absurd and inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption.[26]

[66] For example, the “absurd result” principle has been applied when:

• the requester sought access to their own witness statement,[27]
• the requester was present when the information was provided to the institution,[28] and
• the information was or is clearly within the requester’s knowledge.[29]

[67] However, if disclosure is inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption, the absurd result principle may not apply.[30]

[68] The appellant argues that the absurd result principle applies to the personal information at issue because he has all the records except for the 911 calls. The appellant does not elaborate further on this argument, and his representations go on to make allegations against the police.

[69] The police submit that the absurd result principle does not apply.

[70] Based on my review of the 911 calls, I find that the absurd result principle does not apply. While the appellant may be aware of who the complainant and witness are as a result of his trial, he has not demonstrated that the rest of the personal information contained in the 911 calls are within his knowledge. Furthermore, previous IPC orders have held that, if disclosure is inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption, the absurd result principle may not apply, even if the information was supplied by the requester or is otherwise known to the requester.[31]

[71] Given that the personal information at issue appears in 911 calls to the police about an alleged assault, and my finding that disclosure of that personal information would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy of two affected parties under section 38(b), I find that disclosure under the absurd result principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of the section 38(b) exemption. Therefore, based on the circumstances of this appeal, I find it would not be absurd or inconsistent with the purpose of the section 38(b) exemption to withhold the personal information contained in the 911 calls at issue.

Section 38(b) conclusion

[72] Since withholding the personal information in the 911 calls would not be absurd, I find that the personal information in the 911 calls is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the discretionary exemption at section 38 (b) of the Act , subject to my findings on the police’s exercise of discretion below.

Exercise of discretion

[73] The section 38(b) exemption is discretionary, meaning that the police can decide to disclose information even if the information qualifies for exemption. The police must exercise their discretion. On appeal, I may determine whether the police failed to do so.

[74] The police state that they properly exercised their discretion under section 38(b) to withhold the 911 calls, which contain the personal information of the affected parties, from the appellant. They state that they took into consideration that the 911 calls contain the personal information of the appellant and the affected parties. The police submit that they weighed the appellant’s right of access against the privacy rights of the affected parties. They submit that they also took into account that disclosure could hinder operations and the confidence of the public in assisting with police investigations. They state that they exercised their discretion for a proper purpose and not in bad faith.

[75] The appellant submits that I should not uphold the police’s discretion because they did not exercise their discretion in good faith or for a proper purpose. He submits that the police did not take into consideration relevant considerations and took into consideration irrelevant considerations. Generally, in his representations, the appellant makes allegations against the police’s conduct with respect to his arrest and subsequent trial stating that the police withheld the 911 calls as part of a “cover-up” of their misconduct.

[76] After considering the parties’ representations and the circumstances of this appeal, I find that the police did not err in their exercise of discretion with respect to their decision to deny access to the 911 calls under section 38 (b) of the Act . I am satisfied that the police considered relevant factors and did not consider irrelevant factors in their exercise of discretion. In particular, it is evident that the police considered the fact that the 911 calls contain the appellant’s own personal information and balanced it with the privacy rights of the affected parties.

[77] Accordingly, I find that the police exercised their discretion in an appropriate manner in this appeal, and I uphold it.

[78] Since I uphold the police’s decision to withhold the 911 calls under section 38(b), I do not need to consider the police’s claim that section 38(a) read with section 8(1)(d) also applies to them.

ORDER:

I uphold the police’s decision and dismiss the appeal.

Original Signed by:		January 21, 2025
Anna Truong
Adjudicator