Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Ministry of Public Safety and Security (now the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) (the Ministry) received a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to the “officer’s notes and statements of all witnesses and involved parties” relating to an identified motor vehicle accident. The request was made by a representative for two individuals involved in the accident. The Ministry located the responsive records and granted partial access to them. Access to the remaining portions of the records was denied on the basis of the exemptions found in sections 14(1)(l) (law enforcement), 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), and section 49(b) (invasion of privacy) with reference to sections 21(2)(f) and 21(3)(a) and (b). The Ministry also identified that certain portions of the records at issue were not responsive to the request. The requesters (now the appellants), through their representative, appealed the Ministry’s decision. During mediation, the appellants’ representative confirmed that she was not pursuing access to non- responsive records, nor was she pursuing access to the “police codes” for which section 14(1)(l) and 49(a) were claimed. Accordingly, these issues and access to the records which were denied on the basis of them are no longer issues in this appeal. Mediation did not resolve this file, and it was transferred to the inquiry stage of the process. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the Ministry, initially, and received representations in response. I then sent the Notice of Inquiry, together with a copy of the Ministry’s representations, to the appellants, who also provided representations through their representative. RECORDS: The records remaining at issue consist of portions of 14 pages of police officer’s notes. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION Under section 2(1) of the Act , personal information is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, including information relating to the individual's age (section 2(1)(a)), medical history (section 2(1)(b)), any identifying number, symbol or other particular (section 2(1)(c)), address (section 2(1)(d)), the personal opinions or views of that individual except where they relate to another individual (section 2(1)(e)), the views or opinions of another individual about the individual (section 2(1)(g)) or the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual (section 2(1)(h)). The Ministry submits that the information remaining at issue contains the types of personal information set out in sections 2(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) and (h). The appellants do not address this issue directly, but appear to concede that the records contain the personal information of other individuals. I have reviewed the records remaining at issue and find that they contain information relating to the accident involving the appellants and others. It is my view that the records contain the personal information of the appellants. I also find that the severed portions of the police officer's notes all contain the personal information of identifiable individuals other than the two appellants. INVASION OF PRIVACY Section 47(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 49 provides a number of exemptions from disclosure that limit this general right. The Ministry relies on section 49(b) in conjunction with section 21 to support its denial of access to the records. More specifically, the Ministry relies on the "presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy" at sections 21(3)(a) and (b) and the factor favouring privacy protection at section 21(2)(f). These sections read: (2) A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether, (f) the personal information is highly sensitive; (3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy where the personal information, (a) relates to a medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation; (b) was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation; Under section 49(b), where a record relates to the requester but disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, the institution may refuse to disclose that information to the requester. Section 49(b) is a discretionary exemption. Even if the requirements of section 49(b) are met, the institution must nevertheless consider whether to disclose the information to the requester. In this case, section 49(b) requires the Ministry to exercise its discretion in this regard by balancing the appellants’ right of access to their own personal information against other individuals' right to the protection of their privacy. Sections 21(1) through (4) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure would result in an unjustified invasion of an individual's personal privacy under section 49(b). Sections 21(1)(a) through (e) provide exceptions to the personal privacy exemption; if any of these exceptions apply, the information cannot be exempt from disclosure under section 49(b). Section 21(2) provides some criteria for determining whether the personal privacy exemption applies. Section 21(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 21(4) lists the types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Divisional Court has ruled that once a presumption against disclosure has been established under section 21(3), it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in section 21(2). A section 21(3) presumption can be overcome, however, if the personal information at issue is caught by section 21(4) or if the "compelling public interest" override at section 23 applies ( John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner ) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767). If none of the presumptions in section 21(3) applies, the institution must consider the factors listed in section 21(2), as well as all other relevant circumstances. In support of its position that section 21(3)(a) applies, the Ministry states: ...parts of the personal information remaining at issue contain medical information relating to another identifiable individual. The Ministry submits that release of t
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The Ministry of Public Safety and Security (now the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) (the Ministry) received a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection Privacy Act (the Act) for access to the “officer’s notes and statements of all witnesses and involved parties” relating to an identified motor vehicle accident. The request was made by a representative for two individuals involved in the accident.