Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
BACKGROUND Interim Order PO-2221-I is one in a series of orders involving the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (the Ministry) and an appellant who is seeking access to videotape and photographic records produced during the occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park (Ipperwash) in September 1995. Interim Order PO-2221-I included two provisions (Provisions 3 and 4) requiring Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Superintendent Susan Dunn to provide affidavit evidence attesting to various possible discrepancies in certain identified records and outstanding issues relating to compliance with a previous related order, Interim Order PO-2033-I. The process to be followed and the scope of the evidence to be provided were outlined in these order provisions. Interim Order PO-2221-I also included two different provisions (Provisions 5 and 6) requiring Superintendent Dunn and other current and former officials of the OPP with knowledge of activities taking place at Ipperwash to provide affidavit evidence attesting to the steps taken to identify and locate all records responsive to the appellant’s request (the search affidavits). After reviewing the first affidavit from Superintendent Dunn dealing with Provisions 3 and 4, which was shared with the appellant, I determined that it was inadequate, for reasons outlined in Interim Order PO-2338-I. I determined it would be necessary for me to summon Superintendent Dunn and other OPP officials, pursuant to my authority under section 52(8) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act), and require them to attend before me to give sworn evidence relating to the various outstanding discrepancy issues. Before my scheduled oral inquiry on this matter took place, OPP Commissioner Gwen Boniface asked her RCMP counterpart for a review of the discrepancy issues identified in Provisions 3 and 4 of Interim Order PO-2221-I. After receiving assurances that I would be provided with a copy of the report outlining the results of the RCMP review for use in my inquiry, I decided to adjourn the oral inquiry. I subsequently received a copy of the RCMP report (the Report) as well as a supplementary affidavit from Superintendent Dunn. The Ministry is taking the position that certain portions of the Report may not be shared with the appellant. The primary purpose of this interim order is to rule on this issue. In response to Provisions 5 and 6 of Interim Order PO-2221-I, I received a search affidavit from Superintendent Dunn, one search affidavit from each of 23 current and/or former OPP officials, and one “will say” statement from a 24th official who is now residing outside Canada. The Ministry took the position that these search affidavits could not be shared with the appellant. After receiving representations from the Ministry and the appellant on this sharing issue, I issued Interim Order PO-2263-I, which found that most of the information contained in the affidavits could be shared. The Ministry asked me to reconsider my finding in Interim Order PO-2263-I as it relates to portions of the various search affidavits. I provided the appellant with a copy of the portions of the affidavits not covered by the reconsideration request. My decision on the reconsideration request will be dealt with separately and I will not address it in this interim order. In my discussion of sharing issues in Interim Order PO-2263-I, I acknowledged that small portions of certain search affidavits submitted in response to Provisions 5 and 6 of Interim Order PO-2221-I touched on matters relating to outstanding discrepancy issues regarding Provisions 3 - 2 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] and 4 of that previous order. I decided at that time to defer my findings regarding whether these sections of the relevant search affidavits could be shared with the appellant until I had considered the sharing issues relating to other aspects of Provisions 3 and 4. Accordingly, I will address the outstanding issues relating to these search affidavits in this interim order. I am also in receipt of a second affidavit from Superintendent Dunn that deals with the discrepancy issues outlined in Provisions 3 and 4. This interim order will also deal with whether this affidavit can be shared with the appellant. The Ministry provided representations in support of its position that portions of the RCMP report should not be shared. These representations were shared with the appellant, who responded with representations. The appellant’s representations were in turn shared with the Ministry, which submitted further representations in reply. PRELIMINARY MATTERS: STATUS OF THE RCMP REPORT The Ministry makes the following statement in its first set of representations: The RCMP Report was provided to the Assistant Commissioner by [counsel representing OPP Commissioner Boniface] under cover of a letter dated March 23, 2004. In that letter, [Commissioner Boniface’s counsel] confirmed the “undertaking” of counsel for the Assistant Commissioner, that the “report will be treated as if the subject of a request pursuant to the Act”. The Ministry returns to this subject in its reply representations dealing with the section 15(b) exception - information received in confidence from another government. After repeating the statement from the initial representations, the Ministry goes on to state: In other words, it was expressly understood and agreed that the report was not to be treated as part of the Ministry’s representations for the purpose of this inquiry. It was understood and agreed that the report would be dealt with as if a request for access under the Act had been made with respect to it. Accordingly, the Ministry had every expectation of confidentiality with respect to the record when it was provided to the IPC. Commissioner Boniface’s counsel contacted my counsel in March of this year to advise that Commissioner Boniface had decided to request a review and report by the RCMP on matters that were the subject of this inquiry. At the time, my counsel obtained assurances that I would be provided with a copy of the RCMP Report, and explained the process for sharing representations made in the context of an inquiry under the Act. Although Ministry counsel understands the provisions of Practice Direction 7 that govern sharing matters, Commissioner Boniface’s counsel was new to the process and not necessarily aware of these provisions. In that context, my counsel explained that the Report would be treated in the normal course as part of the - 3 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] Ministry’s representations in my inquiry, and that the confidentiality criteria set out in Practice Direction 7 would be applied in determining whether any portions of the Report should not be shared with the appellant. In particular, my counsel explained the provisions of confidentiality criterion 5(b) and its potential application to a record such as the Report. At no point during this discussion was it “expressly understood and agreed that the Report was not to be treated as part of the Ministry’s representations for the purpose of this inquiry”, as suggested by Ministry counsel. Had that been the case, the March 23, 2004 letter from Commissioner Boniface’s counsel would no doubt have said so. Instead, he refers to the language of criterion 5(b), albeit imprecisely. It is also significant to point out that the March 23, 2004 letter goes on to state: I expect that [Ministry counsel], will make submissions to you regarding the dissemination of the report, including any law enforcement, confidentiality or public interest consideration that should inform its treatment. However, since [Ministry counsel] has been away from the office for several days, and given the desirability that you receive the report as soon as possible, it seemed preferable to provide the report to you now rather than await the Ministry’s submissions. I am sure that your office and [Ministry counsel] will be in communication over the timing of those submissions. Ministry counsel is well aware of the confidentiality criteria described in Practice Direction 7 and how they apply to representations received from the parties during the course of an inquiry. Indeed, the application of these criteria has been the subject of interim orders issued by me during the course of the lengthy proceedings stemming from the appellant’s request. Ministry counsel is also aware of this office’s Code of Procedure, which governs the conduct of an inquiry under the Act. Section 3 of the Code defines “representations” as “the documents, other evidence and/or arguments a party provides to an Adjudicator in an inquiry”. The Report, which was provided to me during the course of this inquiry, clearly meets the requirements of this definition. It should have been clearly understood by all concerned that “the dissemination of the report”, to quote the phrase used by Commissioner Boniface’s counsel, would be governed by the confidentiality criteria under section 5 of Practice Direction 7. The Ministry is well aware that this office does not “disseminate” records subject to an appeal, but rather orders institutions to disclose non-exempt records or portions of records directly to a requester pursuant to section 54(1) of the Act. The statement that Ministry counsel “will make submissions ... regarding the dissemination of the report” makes it clear that Commissioner Boniface’s counsel also understood how I intended to deal with the Report in the context of my inquiry - as part of the Ministry’s representations. I find it quite surprising, indeed disturbing, that Ministry counsel would raise a semantic argument of this nature at this late stage of these proceedings in an effort to convince me that “it was expressly understood and agreed” that the normal processes of this office would not be followed with respect to the Report. I can think of no reason why I would ever have agreed to - 4 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] treat the Report, which speaks to the very issues identified in Provisions 3 and 4 of Interim Order PO-2221-I, as anything other than “a document provided during an inquiry”, as defined in section 3 of the Code of Procedure. And if I had decided to consider departing from the normal process for whatever reason, Ministry counsel should be aware based on my past practices in this lengthy and complex appeal, that I would have provided the Ministry and the appellant with an opportunity to make submissions on whether I should make such a departure before deciding whether to do so. The Report forms part of the Ministry’s representations in this inquiry, and it will be shared with the appellant in the normal course, subject to the application of the confidential criteria in section 5 of Practice Direction 7. CUSTODY AND CONTROL The Ministry prefaces its first set of representations by noting that “there is a real concern as to whether [the Ministry] has ‘custody’ or ‘control’ of the RCMP report within the meaning of s. 10 of the Act.” On its own, this statement appears to question my jurisdiction to deal with the Report in this inquiry. However, the Ministry immediately goes on to state that it is not necessary for me to decide that issue “because the RCMP has authorized the release of the report, subject to certain severances”. I must assume from this rather cryptic statement that the Ministry does not specifically deny that the Report is in its custody or under its control within the meaning of section 10, and that I may therefore proceed to dispose of the sharing issue on the basis of the application of Practice Direction 7. In other words, if I find that the withheld portions of the Report do not, in fact, fit within the confidentiality criteria, I will not be faced with the argument that I lack jurisdiction to share these portions of the Report with the appellant on the ground that the entire Report is outside the scope of the Act because it is not in the Ministry’s custody or control. In this connection, I would observe that at no point did Commissioner Boniface’s counsel suggest that the Report, once presented by the RCMP to his client, would not be within the custody or under the control of the Ministry. More importantly, in my view, any issue of custody or control is simply not germane to a question of sharing evidence and representations provided to this office in an inquiry. If an institution provides me with information and asks me to take it into account in reaching my decision, it cannot dictate how that information is ultimately treated or impose any restrictions based on arguments that are foreign to the normal adjudicative processes. A tribunal is “master of its own processes” and, subject to rules of natural justice and procedural fairness, has the authority to devise procedures that will “achieve a certain balance between the need for fairness, efficiency and predictability of outcome” (See: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Culture) (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 210-214 (S.C.C.); Knight v. Bd. of Ed. of Indian Head School Div. No. 19 (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 489 at 512 per L’Heureux-Dubé J. (S.C.C.)). As I indicated in Interim Order PO-2263-I, the Divisional Court has confirmed that this office has authority to decide whether and the extent to which representations should be shared among the parties, provided that the confidentiality criteria in Practice Direction 7 are adequately - 5 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] considered and applied (See Toronto District School Board v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2002] O.J. No. 4631 (Div. Ct.)). Nonetheless, given that the custody or control issue has been raised, I have decided to consider and dispose of it before proceeding to apply the confidentiality criteria. Although the Ministry has not provided specific representations on this issue, it made the following submissions by way of general background: In February of 2004, by reason of the questions raised by the IPC in the public realm, the Commissioner of the OPP requested an independent investigation by the RCMP into the integrity of the videotapes and audiotapes in issue. The RCMP Report was provided by Chief Superintendent AI McIntyre [sic] of the RCMP to the Commissioner of the OPP on or about March 17, 2004. The report is marked “Confidential” and has a “Security Classification/Designation” of “Protected A”. Chief McIntyre advised that while the “Protected A” designation described as “low-sensitive”, nevertheless a document is “designated protected” when its “unauthorized disclosure ... could reasonably be expected to cause harm to an ongoing or anticipated law-enforcement investigation” or “hinder effective law enforcement by detailing sensitive protective, operational or administrative strategies and procedures”. Chief Superintendent McIntyre “authorize(d) the OPP to release my report to [Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson]”. Chief Superintendent McIntyre stated “(n)o further distribution of same is approved and should others seek access, they will have to follow the appropriate and current process relative to accessing federal agency files and documents”, The RCMP subsequently authorized the release of the report, subject to certain severances. In response to the Ministry’s submissions, the appellant takes the position that the Report is in the Ministry’s custody or control. She submits: Should the Assistant Commissioner decide that he should address that question, the appellant submits that the report and attachments are clearly in the custody or the control of the Ministry. The report is in the possession of the OPP. As Commissioner Linden held in Order P-120, “physical possession of a record is the best evidence of custody, and only in rare cases could it successfully be argued that an institution did not have custody of a record in its actual possession”. - 6 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] This appeal is not one of those “rare cases”. The report was prepared by the RCMP at the request of the OPP, to be submitted to the OPP for use for the OPP's own purposes. The report was created in response to a request from OPP Commissioner Boniface for “the assistance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to technically examine the records provided and submit their opinion respecting the identified issues”. The report is even titled: “Assist to Ontario Provincial Police.” The RCMP was essentially acting as an agent for the OPP, fulfilling a specific mandate set by the OPP Commissioner, examining only the exhibits provided by the OPP (see paragraph 14 of the RCMP report). Moreover, Appendices 2 through 6 (inclusive) are all documents that were prepared by the OPP, including logs describing the videotapes that have already been disclosed to the appellant. Even in the documents prepared by the RCMP, much of the severed information is OPP information. For example, the severance at paragraph 10 of the RCMP report is apparently a description of the affidavits sworn by the OPP for submission to the Assistant Commissioner, affidavits which were ordered to be disclosed to the appellant in Interim Order PO-2263-I. In light of the foregoing, the report and appendices are clearly in the custody or control of the Ministry. The terms “custody” and “control” are defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990) at pages 329 and 384, as follows: Custody: The keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it the idea of the thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to whose custody it is subjected. Control: Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer or oversee. In Ontario (Criminal Code Review Board) v. Doe (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 201, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the word “control” should be given a broad, liberal and purposive construction in order to give effect to the purposes of the Act that citizens should have a meaningful right of access to information (at pp. 209-210). The Court cited with approval the following passage from the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada Post Corporation v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) (1995), 30 Admin. L.R. (2d) 242 (at pp. 244-245): The notion of control referred to in [the Act] is left undefined and unlimited. Parliament did not see fit to distinguish between ultimate and immediate, full and partial, transient and lasting or “de jure” and “de facto” control. Had Parliament intended to qualify and restrict the notion of control to the power to dispose of the - 7 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] information, as suggested by the appellant, it could certainly have done so by limiting the citizen’s right of access only to those documents that the government can dispose of or which are under the lasting or ultimate control of the government. .... It is not in the power of this Court to cut down the broad meaning of the word “control”, as there is nothing in the Act which indicates that the word should not be given its broad meaning. On the contrary, it was Parliament’s intention to give the citizen a meaningful right of access under the Act to government information. In determining whether records are in the custody or under the control of an institution within the meaning of section 10(1) of the Act, this office will consider, among other relevant indicators, several non-exhaustive factors first articulated by former Commissioner Sidney B. Linden in Order P-120, and since used in many subsequent appeals: 1. Was the record created by an officer or employee of the institution? 2. What use did the creator intend to make of the record? 3. Does the institution have possession of the record, either because it has been voluntarily provided by the creator or pursuant to a mandatory statutory or employment requirement? 4. If the institution does not have possession of the record, is it being held by an officer or employee of the institution for the purposes of his or her duties as an officer or an employee? 5. Does the institution have a right to possession of the record? 6. Does the content of the record relate to the institution’s mandate and functions? 7. Does the institution have the authority to regulate the record’s use? 8. To what extent has the record been relied upon by the institution? 9. How closely is the record integrated with other records held by the institution? 10. Does the institution have the authority to dispose of the record? Clearly, the Report is in the custody of the Ministry. It was submitted to Commissioner Boniface, at her request, and it can be implied from the circumstances that “the keeping, - 8 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation or security” of the Report is the responsibility of Commissioner Boniface, whose agency is part of the Ministry for the purposes of the Act. The Report has been provided to me by the Ministry as part of its representations in this inquiry. While various components of the report were prepared by the RCMP, and not by the Ministry or the OPP, it was prepared at the OPP’s request for the benefit and use of the OPP and the Ministry in response to questions that I raised concerning what has been called the “discrepancy” issues in this inquiry. I have been provided with no evidence that the Report or any part of it was prepared for the RCMP’s own purposes or that any specific portions of the Report are being withheld at the RCMP’s request or direction. Indeed, the portions the Ministry has asked me not to share coincide with portions of other documents the Ministry has asked me to withhold from the appellant. None of this information has a direct bearing on any independent concerns that the RCMP would have regarding its own law enforcement functions. Given the purpose of the Report, the fact that it was created at the request of the OPP for the benefit and use of the Ministry and the OPP, the fact that the OPP and the Ministry have actual lawful possession of it and have provided copies of it to me, I find that it is also under the control of the Ministry. SHARING OF REPRESENTATIONS PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION The processes and procedures followed by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (the IPC) in conducting inquiries under the Act are contained in the published Code of Procedure and accompanying Practice Directions. Practice Direction 7 deals with sharing of representations provided by the parties during the course of an inquiry, and identifies the criteria for withholding representations. Sections 5 and 6 of Practice Direction 7 reads as follows: 5.The Adjudicator may withhold information contained in a party’s representations where: (a) disclosure of the information would reveal the substance of a record claimed to be exempt; or (b) the information would be exempt if contained in a record subject to the Act; or (c) the information should not be disclosed to the other party for another reason. 6.For the purposes of section 5(c), the Adjudicator will apply the following test: (i) the party communicated the information to the IPC in a - 9 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] confidence that it would not be disclosed to the other party; (ii) confidentiality is essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the IPC and the party; (iii) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be diligently fostered; and (iv) the injury to the relation that would result from the disclosure of the information is greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the appeal. The Divisional Court has upheld the application of the confidentiality criteria set out in Practice Direction 7 as a proper means for the IPC to determine whether representations of one party can be withheld from another party during the course of an appeal (Toronto District School Board). The Ministry submits that the Report should not be shared for two reasons: 1. The law enforcement exemption in section 14 of the Act applies; 2. Its disclosure could reasonably be expected to reveal information received from another level of government or its agencies within the meaning of section 15(b) of the Act. Although the Ministry does not refer specifically to any of the confidentiality criteria in Practice Direction 7, it is clear that the section 5(b) criterion is the only one with potential application in the context of the Ministry’s representations. THE RCMP REPORT Law Enforcement Section 14(2)(a) - law enforcement report The Ministry identifies section 14(2)(a) as the specific provision of section 14 it is relying on. This section reads: A head may refuse to disclose a record, (a) that is a report prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with the law; - 10 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] representations of the parties The Ministry submits: The Ministry submits that s.14(2)(a) of the Act applies [to] the report. Subsection 14(2)(a) has three elements: first, the record must be a “report”. Second, the report must have been prepared “in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigation”; and third, the report must have been “prepared ... by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with the law”. (See Interim Order PO-2054-I at p.14.) In Order 200, former Commissioner Tom Wright stated as follows with respect to the meaning of “report”: The word ‘report’ is not defined in the Act. However, it is my view that in order to satisfy the first part of the test, i.e., to be a report, a record must consist of a formal statement or account of the results of the collation and consideration of information. Generally speaking, results would not include mere observations or recordings of fact. The Ministry does not agree that a “report” must necessarily include an “account of the results of the collation and consideration of information”. However, it is not necessary to decide that issue in this case, because the RCMP report clearly contains the opinion and conclusions of the RCMP with respect to the integrity of the tapes. The report was prepared “in the course of an “investigation” by the RCMP into the integrity of the tapes in issue [sic]. The investigation by the RCMP could have led to a law enforcement proceeding. (See Order PO-1779 at pages 6 to 8.) There can be no dispute that the RCMP is “an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with the law”. Accordingly, the Ministry submits that s.14(2)(a) applies to the report. The Ministry also relies upon its representations with respect to access to the [search] affidavits and its reply representations, and upon its representations with respect to access to the technical information and records, and upon its reply representations. The appellant agrees with the 3-part test identified by the Ministry and applied in previous orders of this office. The appellant also does not dispute that the third part of the test is satisfied, namely that the RCMP has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with the law. However, she takes issue with the application of the first two parts of the test. In the appellant’s view, the Report is not a “report” as this office has interpreted that term, and the Report was not - 11 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] prepared in the course of “law enforcement, inspections or investigation”. She submits: Section 14(2)(a) of the Act requires consideration of whether each record falls within the exemption: Order PO-1959. Accordingly, each attachment must be considered separately [appellant’s emphasis]. Although the RCMP is an agency that has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with many laws, the RCMP report and attachments do not meet the first part of the s. 14(2)(a) test, and the report and several of the attachments also do not meet the second branch of the test. In order to satisfy the first part of the test, that is to constitute a “report”, the record must consist of a formal statement or account of the results of the collation and consideration of information. Results do not include mere observations or recordings of fact. See e.g. Orders M-1048, MO-1238. An outline of the steps taken by the investigating officer during the course of an investigation constitutes “mere observations and recordings of fact and is not a formal statement or account of the results of the investigation.” Order M-682 (per Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson); see also Order M-397. In Order M-17, Commissioner Wright held that notes compiled by an investigator on an “Information Sheet” did not constitute a report, as “the record is not a formal statement or account of the results of the Licensing Enforcement Officer’s work but a series of entries outlining his observations with respect to his investigation of the appellant's complaint“. The appendices from which information has been severed in this case are “mere observations and recordings of fact”. Appendices 3, 4 and 5, the OPP’s video and audio logs, are officers’ notes of their minute-by-minute observations of the surveillance conducted at Ipperwash Provincial Park. Appendix 6 is also a recording of fact - a list of the exhibits given by the OPP to the RCMP. Appendix 7, a Request for Analysis, lists factual information to provide background to the technical analyst. It is clearly preliminary to any report. Appendix 8 outlines the tests performed by the technical analyst and his observations with respect to his investigation of the integrity of the videotapes. It is also a preliminary description of the analysis, rather than a “formal statement or account of the results” of the RCMP’s investigation. With respect to the March 17, 2004 Investigation Report of Chief Superintendent Macintyre, although some comments might be considered evaluative, as Adjudicator [Sherry] Liang held in Order PO-1988, this is not determinative if the essential nature of the document is to describe observations and facts. Chief Superintendent Macintyre’s report is a day-by-day account, written on a standard pre-printed form, of the steps taken by the RCMP in response to the OPP - 12 - [IPC Interim Order PO-2286-I/May 27, 2004] Commissioner’s request. The few comments that might be considered evaluative do not detract from its essential nature as a descriptive document. Moreover, the Ministry must justify its severances, and it has only severed factual, descriptive parts of the document, not the conclusion section: see Order PO-2054-I (reconsideration request rejected in Order PO-2086-R). Furthermore, although the video and audio logs created by the OPP during the Ipperwash protest (Appendices 4, 5 and 6 [sic – should be Appendices 3, 4, and 5]) were made in the course of law enforcement, the documents created by the OPP and RCMP in response to the OPP Commissioner’s request (i.e. the report and Appendices 7 and 8) are not. There is no reference in either the OPP Commissioner’s letter of request (Appendix 2 to the report) or in Chief Superintendent Macintyre’s report to anticipated law enforcement proceedings. Rather, as noted in the Ministry's submissions …, the Commissioner’s request was made “by reason of the questions raised by the IPC in the public realm”. Similarly, at page 2 of Appendix 7, in the Request for Analysis, Chief Superintendent Macintyre describes the background to the request as being that “the credibility of the Ontario Provincial Police has been publicly questioned”. The OPP’s desire to restore its credibility “in the public realm” is not a “law enforcement” purpose within the meaning of the Act. In reply representations, the Ministry takes issue with the appellant’s characterization of the various components of the Report and restates its position that the Report relates to an investigation that could lead to a law enforcement proceeding: The Appellant argues that the report does not meet the first and second elements of the test under s. 14(2)(a) of the Act. … For the purpose of her argument, the Appellant parses the report into parts and argues that each part of the report should be considered separately. In support of her argument, the Appellant relies upon Order PO-1959. However, Order PO-1959 is not authority for the proposition that each part of a record must meet all three elements of the test. Order PO-1959 states that each record must meet the test. The Ministry sub
Decision Content
BACKGROUND
Interim Order PO-2221-I is one in a series of orders involving the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (the Ministry) and an appellant who is seeking access to videotape and photographic records produced during the occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park (Ipperwash) in September 1995.
Interim Order PO-2221-I included two provisions (Provisions 3 and 4) requiring Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Superintendent Susan Dunn to provide affidavit evidence attesting to various possible discrepancies in certain identified records and outstanding issues relating to compliance with a previous related order, Interim Order PO-2033-I. The process to be followed and the scope of the evidence to be provided were outlined in these order provisions. Interim Order PO-2221-I also included two different provisions (Provisions 5 and 6) requiring Superintendent Dunn and other current and former officials of the OPP with knowledge of activities taking place at Ipperwash to provide affidavit evidence attesting to the steps taken to identify and locate all records responsive to the appellant’s request (the search affidavits).
After reviewing the first affidavit from Superintendent Dunn dealing with Provisions 3 and 4, which was shared with the appellant, I determined that it was inadequate, for reasons outlined in Interim Order PO-2338-I. I determined it would be necessary for me to summon Superintendent Dunn and other OPP officials, pursuant to my authority under section 52(8) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act), and require them to attend before me to give sworn evidence relating to the various outstanding discrepancy issues. Before my scheduled oral inquiry on this matter took place, OPP Commissioner Gwen Boniface asked her RCMP counterpart for a review of the discrepancy issues identified in Provisions 3 and 4 of Interim Order PO-2221-I. After receiving assurances that I would be provided with a copy of the report outlining the results of the RCMP review for use in my inquiry, I decided to adjourn the oral inquiry. I subsequently received a copy of the RCMP report (the Report) as well as a supplementary affidavit from Superintendent Dunn. The Ministry is taking the position that certain portions of the Report may not be shared with the appellant. The primary purpose of this interim order is to rule on this issue.
In response to Provisions 5 and 6 of Interim Order PO-2221-I, I received a search affidavit from Superintendent Dunn, one search affidavit from each of 23 current and/or former OPP officials, and one “will say” statement from a 24th official who is now residing outside Canada. The Ministry took the position that these search affidavits could not be shared with the appellant. After receiving representations from the Ministry and the appellant on this sharing issue, I issued Interim Order PO-2263-I, which found that most of the information contained in the affidavits could be shared. The Ministry asked me to reconsider my finding in Interim Order PO-2263-I as it relates to portions of the various search affidavits. I provided the appellant with a copy of the portions of the affidavits not covered by the reconsideration request. My decision on the reconsideration request will be dealt with separately and I will not address it in this interim order.
In my discussion of sharing issues in Interim Order PO-2263-I, I acknowledged that small portions of certain search affidavits submitted in response to Provisions 5 and 6 of Interim Order PO-2221-I touched on matters relating to outstanding discrepancy issues regarding Provisions 3 and 4 of that previous order. I decided at that time to defer my findings regarding whether these sections of the relevant search affidavits could be shared with the appellant until I had considered the sharing issues relating to other aspects of Provisions 3 and 4. Accordingly, I will address the outstanding issues relating to these search affidavits in this interim order.
I am also in receipt of a second affidavit from Superintendent Dunn that deals with the discrepancy issues outlined in Provisions 3 and 4. This interim order will also deal with whether this affidavit can be shared with the appellant.
The Ministry provided representations in support of its position that portions of the RCMP report should not be shared. These representations were shared with the appellant, who responded with representations. The appellant’s representations were in turn shared with the Ministry, which submitted further representations in reply.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS:
STATUS OF THE RCMP REPORT
The Ministry makes the following statement in its first set of representations:
The RCMP Report was provided to the Assistant Commissioner by [counsel representing OPP Commissioner Boniface] under cover of a letter dated March 23, 2004. In that letter, [Commissioner Boniface’s counsel] confirmed the “undertaking” of counsel for the Assistant Commissioner, that the “report will be treated as if the subject of a request pursuant to the Act”.
The Ministry returns to this subject in its reply representations dealing with the section 15(b) exception - information received in confidence from another government. After repeating the statement from the initial representations, the Ministry goes on to state:
In other words, it was expressly understood and agreed that the report was not to be treated as part of the Ministry’s representations for the purpose of this inquiry. It was understood and agreed that the report would be dealt with as if a request for access under the Act had been made with respect to it. Accordingly, the Ministry had every expectation of confidentiality with respect to the record when it was provided to the IPC.
Commissioner Boniface’s counsel contacted my counsel in March of this year to advise that Commissioner Boniface had decided to request a review and report by the RCMP on matters that were the subject of this inquiry. At the time, my counsel obtained assurances that I would be provided with a copy of the RCMP Report, and explained the process for sharing representations made in the context of an inquiry under the Act. Although Ministry counsel understands the provisions of Practice Direction 7 that govern sharing matters, Commissioner Boniface’s counsel was new to the process and not necessarily aware of these provisions. In that context, my counsel explained that the Report would be treated in the normal course as part of the Ministry’s representations in my inquiry, and that the confidentiality criteria set out in Practice Direction 7 would be applied in determining whether any portions of the Report should not be shared with the appellant. In particular, my counsel explained the provisions of confidentiality criterion 5(b) and its potential application to a record such as the Report.
At no point during this discussion was it “expressly understood and agreed that the Report was not to be treated as part of the Ministry’s representations for the purpose of this inquiry”, as suggested by Ministry counsel. Had that been the case, the March 23, 2004 letter from Commissioner Boniface’s counsel would no doubt have said so. Instead, he refers to the language of criterion 5(b), albeit imprecisely. It is also significant to point out that the March 23, 2004 letter goes on to state:
I expect that [Ministry counsel], will make submissions to you regarding the dissemination of the report, including any law enforcement, confidentiality or public interest consideration that should inform its treatment. However, since [Ministry counsel] has been away from the office for several days, and given the desirability that you receive the report as soon as possible, it seemed preferable to provide the report to you now rather than await the Ministry’s submissions. I am sure that your office and [Ministry counsel] will be in communication over the timing of those submissions.
Ministry counsel is well aware of the confidentiality criteria described in Practice Direction 7 and how they apply to representations received from the parties during the course of an inquiry. Indeed, the application of these criteria has been the subject of interim orders issued by me during the course of the lengthy proceedings stemming from the appellant’s request. Ministry counsel is also aware of this office’s Code of Procedure, which governs the conduct of an inquiry under the Act. Section 3 of the Code defines “representations” as “the documents, other evidence and/or arguments a party provides to an Adjudicator in an inquiry”. The Report, which was provided to me during the course of this inquiry, clearly meets the requirements of this definition.
It should have been clearly understood by all concerned that “the dissemination of the report”, to quote the phrase used by Commissioner Boniface’s counsel, would be governed by the confidentiality criteria under section 5 of Practice Direction 7. The Ministry is well aware that this office does not “disseminate” records subject to an appeal, but rather orders institutions to disclose non-exempt records or portions of records directly to a requester pursuant to section 54(1) of the Act. The statement that Ministry counsel “will make submissions ... regarding the dissemination of the report” makes it clear that Commissioner Boniface’s counsel also understood how I intended to deal with the Report in the context of my inquiry - as part of the Ministry’s representations.
I find it quite surprising, indeed disturbing, that Ministry counsel would raise a semantic argument of this nature at this late stage of these proceedings in an effort to convince me that “it was expressly understood and agreed” that the normal processes of this office would not be followed with respect to the Report. I can think of no reason why I would ever have agreed to treat the Report, which speaks to the very issues identified in Provisions 3 and 4 of Interim Order PO-2221-I, as anything other than “a document provided during an inquiry”, as defined in section 3 of the Code of Procedure. And if I had decided to consider departing from the normal process for whatever reason, Ministry counsel should be aware based on my past practices in this lengthy and complex appeal, that I would have provided the Ministry and the appellant with an opportunity to make submissions on whether I should make such a departure before deciding whether to do so.
The Report forms part of the Ministry’s representations in this inquiry, and it will be shared with the appellant in the normal course, subject to the application of the confidential criteria in section 5 of Practice Direction 7.
CUSTODY AND CONTROL
The Ministry prefaces its first set of representations by noting that “there is a real concern as to whether [the Ministry] has ‘custody’ or ‘control’ of the RCMP report within the meaning of s. 10 of the Act.” On its own, this statement appears to question my jurisdiction to deal with the Report in this inquiry. However, the Ministry immediately goes on to state that it is not necessary for me to decide that issue “because the RCMP has authorized the release of the report, subject to certain severances”.
I must assume from this rather cryptic statement that the Ministry does not specifically deny that the Report is in its custody or under its control within the meaning of section 10, and that I may therefore proceed to dispose of the sharing issue on the basis of the application of Practice Direction 7. In other words, if I find that the withheld portions of the Report do not, in fact, fit within the confidentiality criteria, I will not be faced with the argument that I lack jurisdiction to share these portions of the Report with the appellant on the ground that the entire Report is outside the scope of the Act because it is not in the Ministry’s custody or control. In this connection, I would observe that at no point did Commissioner Boniface’s counsel suggest that the Report, once presented by the RCMP to his client, would not be within the custody or under the control of the Ministry.
More importantly, in my view, any issue of custody or control is simply not germane to a question of sharing evidence and representations provided to this office in an inquiry. If an institution provides me with information and asks me to take it into account in reaching my decision, it cannot dictate how that information is ultimately treated or impose any restrictions based on arguments that are foreign to the normal adjudicative processes. A tribunal is “master of its own processes” and, subject to rules of natural justice and procedural fairness, has the authority to devise procedures that will “achieve a certain balance between the need for fairness, efficiency and predictability of outcome” (See: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Culture) (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 210-214 (S.C.C.); Knight v. Bd. of Ed. of Indian Head School Div. No. 19 (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 489 at 512 per L’Heureux-Dubé J. (S.C.C.)). As I indicated in Interim Order PO-2263-I, the Divisional Court has confirmed that this office has authority to decide whether and the extent to which representations should be shared among the parties, provided that the confidentiality criteria in Practice Direction 7 are adequately considered and applied (See Toronto District School Board v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2002] O.J. No. 4631 (Div. Ct.)).
Nonetheless, given that the custody or control issue has been raised, I have decided to consider and dispose of it before proceeding to apply the confidentiality criteria.
Although the Ministry has not provided specific representations on this issue, it made the following submissions by way of general background:
In February of 2004, by reason of the questions raised by the IPC in the public realm, the Commissioner of the OPP requested an independent investigation by the RCMP into the integrity of the videotapes and audiotapes in issue.
The RCMP Report was provided by Chief Superintendent AI McIntyre [sic] of the RCMP to the Commissioner of the OPP on or about March 17, 2004. The report is marked “Confidential” and has a “Security Classification/Designation” of “Protected A”.
Chief McIntyre advised that while the “Protected A” designation described as “low‑sensitive”, nevertheless a document is “designated protected” when its “unauthorized disclosure ... could reasonably be expected to cause harm to an ongoing or anticipated law‑enforcement investigation” or “hinder effective law enforcement by detailing sensitive protective, operational or administrative strategies and procedures”.
Chief Superintendent McIntyre “authorize(d) the OPP to release my report to [Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson]”. Chief Superintendent McIntyre stated “(n)o further distribution of same is approved and should others seek access, they will have to follow the appropriate and current process relative to accessing federal agency files and documents”,
The RCMP subsequently authorized the release of the report, subject to certain severances.
In response to the Ministry’s submissions, the appellant takes the position that the Report is in the Ministry’s custody or control. She submits:
Should the Assistant Commissioner decide that he should address that question, the appellant submits that the report and attachments are clearly in the custody or the control of the Ministry.
The report is in the possession of the OPP. As Commissioner Linden held in Order P-120, “physical possession of a record is the best evidence of custody, and only in rare cases could it successfully be argued that an institution did not have custody of a record in its actual possession”.
This appeal is not one of those “rare cases”. The report was prepared by the RCMP at the request of the OPP, to be submitted to the OPP for use for the OPP's own purposes. The report was created in response to a request from OPP Commissioner Boniface for “the assistance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to technically examine the records provided and submit their opinion respecting the identified issues”. The report is even titled: “Assist to Ontario Provincial Police.” The RCMP was essentially acting as an agent for the OPP, fulfilling a specific mandate set by the OPP Commissioner, examining only the exhibits provided by the OPP (see paragraph 14 of the RCMP report).
Moreover, Appendices 2 through 6 (inclusive) are all documents that were prepared by the OPP, including logs describing the videotapes that have already been disclosed to the appellant.
Even in the documents prepared by the RCMP, much of the severed information is OPP information. For example, the severance at paragraph 10 of the RCMP report is apparently a description of the affidavits sworn by the OPP for submission to the Assistant Commissioner, affidavits which were ordered to be disclosed to the appellant in Interim Order PO‑2263-I.
In light of the foregoing, the report and appendices are clearly in the custody or control of the Ministry.
The terms “custody” and “control” are defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990) at pages 329 and 384, as follows:
Custody: The keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it the idea of the thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to whose custody it is subjected.
Control: Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer or oversee.
In Ontario (Criminal Code Review Board) v. Doe (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 201, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the word “control” should be given a broad, liberal and purposive construction in order to give effect to the purposes of the Act that citizens should have a meaningful right of access to information (at pp. 209-210). The Court cited with approval the following passage from the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada Post Corporation v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) (1995), 30 Admin. L.R. (2d) 242 (at pp. 244‑245):
The notion of control referred to in [the Act] is left undefined and unlimited. Parliament did not see fit to distinguish between ultimate and immediate, full and partial, transient and lasting or “de jure” and “de facto” control. Had Parliament intended to qualify and restrict the notion of control to the power to dispose of the information, as suggested by the appellant, it could certainly have done so by limiting the citizen’s right of access only to those documents that the government can dispose of or which are under the lasting or ultimate control of the government.
....
It is not in the power of this Court to cut down the broad meaning of the word “control”, as there is nothing in the Act which indicates that the word should not be given its broad meaning. On the contrary, it was Parliament’s intention to give the citizen a meaningful right of access under the Act to government information.