Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Halton Regional Police Services Board (the Police) received a requestunder the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to all police records relating to a specifiedassault incident. The requester was the victim and was injured during theassault. The Police located the records and notified those third parties whoseinterests may be affected by the disclosure of the records. Some of the thirdparties consented to the disclosure of their information while others objected. Some of the third parties did not respond to the Police notification. ThePolice granted partial access to the records. The requester appealed thedecision to deny access to the remaining records. The Police denied access to the remaining records, in whole or in part, onthe basis of the exemptions contained in the following sections of the Act : law enforcement - sections 8(1)(a) and (b), 8(2)(a) and (c) invasion of privacy - section 14(1) During mediation, the requester (now the appellant) narrowed the scope ofthe appeal to the names of suspects. Therefore, I will only consider theapplication of the exemptions claimed by the Police to this information in therecords. This office provided a Notice of Inquiry to the appellant and the Police. Because the information at issue can be interpreted as being the information ofboth the appellant and the suspects, the Notice of Inquiry raised the possibleapplication of sections 38(a) and (b) (discretion to refuse requester's owninformation and invasion of privacy) of the Act . Representations werereceived from the Police only. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION Under section 2(1) of the Act , "personal information" isdefined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual. I have reviewed the records and find that they contain the personal informationof the appellant and other identifiable individuals. INVASION OF PRIVACY Section 36(1) of the Act allows individuals access to their ownpersonal information held by a government institution. However, section 38 setsout exceptions to this general right of access. Where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant andother individuals, section 38(b) of the Act allows the Police towithhold information from the record if they determine that disclosing thatinformation would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Onappeal, I must be satisfied that disclosure would constitutean unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy. The appellantis not required to prove the contrary. Sections 14(2), (3) and (4) provide guidance in determining whetherdisclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion ofpersonal privacy. Disclosing the type of personal information listed in section14(3) is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. If one ofthe presumptions applies, the Police can disclose the personal information onlyif it falls under section 14(4) or if section 16 applies to it. If none of thepresumptions in section 14(3) apply, the Police must consider the factors listedin section 14(2), as well as all other relevant circumstances. The Police submit that the records were generated as part of aninvestigation into the assault incident. The Police state that the informationin the records was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation intoa possible violation of the Criminal Code . The Police state thatdisclosure of the information would constitute a presumed unjustified invasionof personal privacy. The Police state that there is not sufficient evidence tolay criminal charges at this time but that this situation could change. I have reviewed the records and I am satisfied that the requirements for apresumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14(3)(b) havebeen established. In my view, the fact that criminal charges have not beenlaid, does not in any way negate the application of the presumption under the Act . Section 14(4) does not apply in the circumstances of this appealand the appellant has not raised the application of section 16. Accordingly,the personal information in the records is properly exempt under section 38(b)of the Act . Because of the findings I have made above, it is not necessary for me toconsider the application of sections 8(1)(a) and (b), sections 8(2)(a) and (c)and section 38(a). ORDER: I uphold the decision of the Police. Original signed by: Mumtaz Jiwan, Inquiry Officer February 18, 1997
Decision Content
ORDER M-901
Appeal M_9600298
Halton Regional Police Services Board
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The Halton Regional Police Services Board (the Police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) for access to all police records relating to a specified assault incident. The requester was the victim and was injured during the assault. The Police located the records and notified those third parties whose interests may be affected by the disclosure of the records. Some of the third parties consented to the disclosure of their information while others objected. Some of the third parties did not respond to the Police notification. The Police granted partial access to the records. The requester appealed the decision to deny access to the remaining records.
The Police denied access to the remaining records, in whole or in part, on the basis of the exemptions contained in the following sections of the Act:
• law enforcement - sections 8(1)(a) and (b), 8(2)(a) and (c)
• invasion of privacy - section 14(1)
During mediation, the requester (now the appellant) narrowed the scope of the appeal to the names of suspects. Therefore, I will only consider the application of the exemptions claimed by the Police to this information in the records.
This office provided a Notice of Inquiry to the appellant and the Police. Because the information at issue can be interpreted as being the information of both the appellant and the suspects, the Notice of Inquiry raised the possible application of sections 38(a) and (b) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information and invasion of privacy) of the Act. Representations were received from the Police only.
DISCUSSION:
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Under section 2(1) of the Act, “personal information” is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual. I have reviewed the records and find that they contain the personal information of the appellant and other identifiable individuals.
INVASION OF PRIVACY
Section 36(1) of the Act allows individuals access to their own personal information held by a government institution. However, section 38 sets out exceptions to this general right of access.
Where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant and other individuals, section 38(b) of the Act allows the Police to withhold information from the record if they determine that disclosing that information would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. On appeal, I must be satisfied that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual’s personal privacy. The appellant is not required to prove the contrary.
Sections 14(2), (3) and (4) provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Disclosing the type of personal information listed in section 14(3) is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. If one of the presumptions applies, the Police can disclose the personal information only if it falls under section 14(4) or if section 16 applies to it. If none of the presumptions in section 14(3) apply, the Police must consider the factors listed in section 14(2), as well as all other relevant circumstances.
The Police submit that the records were generated as part of an investigation into the assault incident. The Police state that the information in the records was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of the Criminal Code. The Police state that disclosure of the information would constitute a presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Police state that there is not sufficient evidence to lay criminal charges at this time but that this situation could change.
I have reviewed the records and I am satisfied that the requirements for a presumed unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14(3)(b) have been established. In my view, the fact that criminal charges have not been laid, does not in any way negate the application of the presumption under the Act. Section 14(4) does not apply in the circumstances of this appeal and the appellant has not raised the application of section 16. Accordingly, the personal information in the records is properly exempt under section 38(b) of the Act.
Because of the findings I have made above, it is not necessary for me to consider the application of sections 8(1)(a) and (b), sections 8(2)(a) and (c) and section 38(a).
ORDER:
I uphold the decision of the Police.
Original signed by: February 18, 1997
Mumtaz Jiwan
Inquiry Officer