

Information and Privacy Commissioner,  
Ontario, Canada



Commissaire à l'information et à la protection de la vie privée,  
Ontario, Canada

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## ORDER PO-4323

Appeal PA20-00132

McMaster University

November 29, 2022

**Summary:** The appellant submitted a nine-part access request to McMaster University (the university) under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (the *Act*) for specific records about him, including emails, letters, minutes, reports and memos sent by various university staff to other staff. In response, the university decided to disclose a substantial number of records to him but denied access to other records and parts of records under the discretionary exemption in section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester's own information), read with sections 13(1) (advice and recommendations) and 19 (solicitor-client privilege) of the *Act*. The appellant appealed the university's access decision to the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. In this order, the adjudicator finds that the records and parts of records containing the appellant's personal information that have been withheld from him by the university are all exempt from disclosure under section 49(a), read with section 19(a) of the *Act*. He upholds the university's access decision and dismisses the appeal.

**Statutes Considered:** *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, as amended, sections 49(a), 19(a) and 23.

**Orders Considered:** Orders PO-3686 and PO-4013.

### OVERVIEW:

[1] The appellant was a student at McMaster University (the university) who sought accommodation for various matters from the university's Student Accessibility Services (SAS), which provides academic accommodation assistance and related supports to

students with disabilities. In March 2019, SAS denied the appellant's request for reassessment of an Accommodation Plan.<sup>1</sup>

[2] The university subsequently claimed that the appellant's behavior in response to this denial led it to impose an "involuntary withdrawal on compassionate grounds" on him under its *Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities*, and to declare him a "*persona non grata*."<sup>2</sup> The appellant filed a complaint against the university with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), alleging that it had discriminated against him on the basis of prohibited grounds in the *Ontario Human Rights Code*.<sup>3</sup>

[3] The appellant also submitted two access requests with the university under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (the *Act*) and sought access to records relating to his disputes with the university. In response, the university issued one decision responding to both requests. It denied both requests for access because it decided that they were frivolous or vexatious under section 10(1)(b) of the *Act*. The appellant appealed the university's decision to the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC).

[4] In Order PO-4013, the adjudicator found that the university had not established reasonable grounds for deciding that the appellant's access requests were frivolous or vexatious under section 10(1)(b) of the *Act*. She ordered the university to issue access decisions to him responding to both requests.

[5] The appellant's first access request had nine parts and was for specific records about him, including emails, letters, minutes, reports and memos sent by various university staff to other staff. Some parts of his access request specifically sought emails and other records sent from staff in the Faculty of Engineering to SAS and vice versa.

[6] In compliance with Order PO-4013, the university located records that were responsive to the appellant's nine-part access request and issued an access decision to him. The decision stated that the university had located 1,012 records, totaling 3,208 pages. It decided to grant him access to 708 records in full, totaling 2,599 pages and 215 records in part, totaling 335 pages.

[7] The university denied access to 89 records in full under section 49(a) (discretion to refuse requester's own information), read with section 13(1) (advice and recommendations) and sections 19(a) and (c) (solicitor-client privilege). In addition, it denied access to parts of 215 records under the discretionary exemption in section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c), and under section 49(b) (personal privacy).

[8] The appellant appealed the university's decision to deny him access to those

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<sup>1</sup> As summarized in Order PO-4013.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.

records and parts of records to the IPC, which assigned a mediator to assist the parties in resolving the issues in dispute.

[9] The appellant advised the mediator that he wished to pursue access to the records and parts of records withheld by the university, except for the personal information of individuals other than himself, which the university had withheld under section 49(b). Consequently, the section 49(b) exemption and the 42 records containing the information of individuals other than the appellant are no longer at issue in this appeal.<sup>4</sup> The appellant also claimed that the public interest override in section 23 of the *Act* applied to the records and parts of records withheld by the university.

[10] This appeal was not resolved during mediation<sup>5</sup> and was moved to adjudication, where an adjudicator may conduct an inquiry to review an institution's access decision. The adjudicator initially assigned to this appeal sought and received representations on the issues to be resolved from both the university and the appellant.

[11] In its representations, the university stated that it exercised its discretion and decided to disclose previously redacted portions of 13 records to the appellant. As a result, those records are no longer at issue in this appeal. In addition, it stated that it was withdrawing its reliance on the discretionary exemption in section 13(1).<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the only exemption that remains at issue in this appeal is section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c).

[12] In his representations, the appellant raises a constitutional issue. He submits that the university breached his rights under sections 7, 12 and 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (the *Charter*) and seeks a remedy under section 24. I will address this constitutional issue under the heading "Other Issues" in this order.

[13] This appeal was subsequently transferred to me to continue the inquiry. I invited the university to respond to the appellant's representations. In response, I received reply representations from the university.

[14] In this order, I find that:

- the records and parts of records containing the appellant's personal information that have been withheld from him by the university are exempt from disclosure under section 49(a), read with section 19(a) of the *Act*,
- the university exercised its discretion under section 49(a) and did so properly in deciding to withhold those records and parts of records from the appellant, and

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<sup>4</sup> The only information that the university redacted in those records was the information of individuals other than the appellant.

<sup>5</sup> According to the mediator's report issued to the parties, 278 records remained at issue at the conclusion of mediation, including 89 records withheld in full by the university and 189 records withheld in part.

<sup>6</sup> The university continues to claim section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c), for those parts of the records.

- the public interest override in section 23 cannot apply to the records and parts of records that the university has withheld under section 49(a), read with section 19(a), because section 19 is not listed in section 23 as one of the exemptions that can be subject to the public interest override.

[15] In addition, I decide to exercise my discretion not to consider the constitutional question raised by the appellant after the applicable 35-day time limit set out in section 3 of *Practice Direction Number 9*.

[16] I uphold the university's access decision and dismiss the appeal.

## **RECORDS:**

[17] There are 223 records remaining at issue in this appeal, which are mostly emails between university staff about the appellant. They are summarized in the index of records that the university provided to the appellant and the IPC.<sup>7</sup> The university has withheld 89 of these records in full and 134 in part under section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c), totaling more than 500 pages.

## **ISSUES:**

- A. Do the records contain the appellant's "personal information" as defined in section 2(1) of the *Act*?
- B. Does the discretionary exemption at section 49(a) of the *Act*, allowing an institution to refuse access to a requester's own personal information, read with the sections 19(a) and (c) exemptions, apply to the information at issue?
- C. Did the university exercise its discretion under section 49(a)? If so, should the IPC uphold the university's exercise of discretion?
- D. Is there a compelling public interest in disclosure of the records that clearly outweighs the purpose of the section 49(a) exemption, read with section 19?

## **DISCUSSION:**

### **A. Do the records contain the appellant's "personal information" as defined in section 2(1) of the *Act*?**

[18] The discretionary exemption at section 49(a) of the *Act* can only apply if the

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<sup>7</sup> Minus those records that were taken off the table during both mediation and adjudication.

records at issue contain the requester's (appellant's) personal information.<sup>8</sup>

[19] Section 2(1) of the *Act* defines "personal information" as "recorded information about an identifiable individual."

[20] "Recorded information" is information recorded in any format, such as paper records, electronic records, digital photographs, videos, or maps.<sup>9</sup>

[21] Section 2(1) of the *Act* gives a list of examples of personal information:

"personal information" means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including,

(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual,

(b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,

(c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,

(d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,

(e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except if they relate to another individual,

(f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence,

(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and

(h) the individual's name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual.

[22] The list of examples of personal information under section 2(1) is not a complete

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<sup>8</sup> The relevant exemptions to consider for general access requests are found at sections 12-22.

<sup>9</sup> See the definition of "record" in section 2(1).

list. This means that other kinds of information could also be “personal information.”<sup>10</sup>

[23] Information is about an “identifiable individual” if it is reasonable to expect that an individual can be identified from the information either by itself or if combined with other information.<sup>11</sup>

[24] In their representations, both the university and the appellant agree that the records at issue contain the appellant’s “personal information,” as that term is defined in section 2(1) of the *Act*.

[25] I have examined the records at issue, which are emails between university staff about the appellant’s accommodation requests. There does not appear to be any real dispute, and I find that the information about the appellant in these emails falls within a number of paragraphs of the definition of “personal information” in section 2(1), including paragraphs (b), (c), (g) and (h).

[26] In short, I find that the records contain the appellant’s “personal information,” as that term is defined in section 2(1) of the *Act*.

**B. Does the discretionary exemption at section 49(a) of the *Act*, allowing an institution to refuse access to a requester’s own personal information, read with the sections 19(a) and (c) exemptions, apply to the information at issue?**

[27] Section 47(1) of the *Act* gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 49 provides some exemptions from this general right of access to one’s own personal information.

[28] Section 49(a) of the *Act* reads:

A head may refuse to disclose to the individual to whom the information relates personal information,

where section 12, 13, 14, 14.1, 14.2, 15, 15.1, 16, 17, 18, **19**, 20 or 22 would apply to the disclosure of that personal information.

[29] In this case, the university relies on section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c), to deny access to 89 records in full and 134 records in part.

**Solicitor-client privilege**

[30] Section 19 exempts certain records from disclosure, either because they are subject to solicitor-client privilege or because they were prepared by or for legal counsel

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<sup>10</sup> Order 11.

<sup>11</sup> Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in *Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe*, [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.).

for an institution. It states:

A head may refuse to disclose a record,

- (a) that is subject to solicitor-client privilege;
- (b) that was prepared by or for Crown counsel for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or for use in litigation; or
- (c) that was prepared by or for counsel employed or retained by an educational institution or a hospital for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or for use in litigation.

[31] Section 19 contains three different exemptions, which the IPC has referred in previous decisions as making up two “branches.”

[32] The first branch, found in section 19(a), (“subject to solicitor-client privilege”) is based on common law. The second branch, found in sections 19(b) and (c), (“prepared by or for Crown counsel” or “prepared by or for counsel employed or retained by an educational institution or hospital”) contains statutory privileges created by the *Act*.

[33] The institution must establish that at least one branch applies.

[34] In the circumstances of this appeal, the university claims that the 89 records that it withheld in full and the 134 records that it withheld in part are exempt from disclosure under both branches [sections 19(a) and (c)].

[35] I will start by determining whether these records and parts of records are exempt from disclosure under the solicitor-client communication privilege aspect of the first branch found in section 19(a).

### ***Branch 1: common law privilege***

[36] At common law, solicitor-client privilege encompasses two types of privilege:

- solicitor-client communication privilege, and
- litigation privilege.

#### *Common law solicitor-client communication privilege*

[37] The rationale for the common law solicitor-client communication privilege is to ensure that a client may freely confide in their lawyer on a legal matter.<sup>12</sup> This privilege protects direct communications of a confidential nature between lawyer and client, or

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<sup>12</sup> Orders PO-2441, MO-2166 and MO-1925.

their agents or employees, made for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice.<sup>13</sup> The privilege covers not only the legal advice itself and the request for advice, but also communications between the lawyer and client aimed at keeping both informed so that advice can be sought and given.<sup>14</sup>

[38] The privilege may also apply to the lawyer's working papers directly related to seeking, formulating or giving legal advice.<sup>15</sup>

[39] Confidentiality is an essential component of solicitor-client communication privilege. The institution must demonstrate that the communication was made in confidence, either expressly or by implication.<sup>16</sup> The privilege does not cover communications between a lawyer and a party on the other side of a transaction.<sup>17</sup>

### *Waiver*

[40] Under the common law, a client may waive solicitor-client privilege. An express waiver of privilege happens where the client knows of the existence of the privilege, and voluntarily demonstrates an intention to waive the privilege.<sup>18</sup>

[41] There may also be an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege where fairness requires it, and where some form of voluntary conduct by the client supports a finding of an implied or objective intention to waive it.<sup>19</sup>

[42] Generally, disclosure to outsiders of privileged information is a waiver of privilege.<sup>20</sup> However, waiver may not apply where the record is disclosed to another party that has a common interest with the disclosing party.<sup>21</sup>

### ***Summary of university's representations***

[43] The university submits that the records at issue include:

- emails including legal counsel, which are solicitor-client privileged on the basis that they relate to the seeking and giving of legal advice,

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<sup>13</sup> *Descôteaux v. Mierzewski* (1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 590 (S.C.C.).

<sup>14</sup> *Balabel v. Air India*, [1988] 2 W.L.R. 1036 at 1046 (Eng. C.A.); *Canada (Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Canada (Information Commissioner)*, 2013 FCA 104.

<sup>15</sup> *Susan Hosiery Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue*, [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 27.

<sup>16</sup> *General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz* (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.); Order MO-2936.

<sup>17</sup> *Kitcener (City) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner)*, 2012 ONSC 3496 (Div. Ct.).

<sup>18</sup> *S. & K. Processors Ltd. v. Campbell Avenue Herring Producers Ltd.* (1983), 45 B.C.L.R. 218 (S.C.).

<sup>19</sup> *R. v. Youvarajah*, 2011 ONCA 654 (CanLII) and Order MO-2945-I.

<sup>20</sup> J. Sopinka et al., *The Law of Evidence in Canada* at p. 669; Order P-1342, upheld on judicial review in *Ontario (Attorney General) v. Big Canoe*, [1997] O.J. No. 4495 (Div. Ct.).

<sup>21</sup> *General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz*, cited above; Orders MO-1678 and PO-3167.



- emails prepared with a view to seeking advice of or being delivered to counsel, which are solicitor-client privileged on the basis that they relate to the seeking and giving of legal advice,
- drafts of documentation/correspondence, which constitute work product and are solicitor-client privileged on the basis that they relate to the seeking and giving of legal advice, and
- internal emails conveying legal advice of counsel, which are solicitor-client privileged on the basis that they relate to the seeking and giving of legal advice.

[44] It further submits that all of the records form part of the confidential continuum of communication between the university and its legal counsel (both internal and external) in relation to matters involving the appellant, and at no time has privilege been waived with respect to any record.

### ***Summary of appellant's representations***

[45] The appellant states that with respect to the common law solicitor-client communication privilege in section 19(a) (branch 1), "legal advice" is a solicitor giving a legal opinion about an issue, and a recommended course of action based on legal consideration. He submits that it does not include information that was provided about a matter having legal implications where no legal opinion was expressed or where no course of action based on legal considerations was recommended. The fact that a lawyer was copied in an email or reviewed a record does not of itself mean that the record falls within the exemption.

[46] He submits that four criteria must be met:

- there must be written or oral communication,
- the communication must be of confidential nature,
- the communication must be between an institution and legal counsel, and
- the communication must be directly related to seeking, formulating, or giving legal advice.

[47] He further asserts that privilege does not attach to every communication between the lawyer and the university. He submits that just because a lawyer or lawyers participated in the discussion or were copied in the email is not sufficient to cover the communication under solicitor-client privilege. The communication must involve the provision of legal advice.

[48] He further states that while it is difficult for him to comment on the records because he has not seen them, he believes that not every record falls within solicitor-

client privilege because it is unlikely that the university communicated and sought legal advice in every email. He submits that when the university's legal counsel advises on non- legal issues, it is not considered legal advice, and the exemption at section 19 does not apply.

[49] On the issue of waiver of solicitor-client privilege, the appellant claims that loss of privilege (waiver) occurred in these records. He states that privilege can be lost through carelessness, which results in loss of confidentiality through disclosure of the information, and there does not have to be a clear intent to waive privilege before it can be lost. He submits that the wider dissemination of information and legal advice from lawyers would often cause such information to lose its confidential character.

[50] He further submits that when the university communicates legal advice provided by its lawyers to other employees, they must have an interest in obtaining the information. If the distribution is to persons with no apparent need to know, then the IPC and a court are more likely to find that the necessary confidentiality was not maintained and that privilege has been waived.

### ***Summary of university's reply representations***

[51] In response to the appellant's representations, the university states that the most important question when the status of communications to or from a lawyer is questioned, is whether those communications took place within the context or continuum of a solicitor-client relationship. It submits that once privilege has been established, it applies to all communications made within the framework of the solicitor-client relationship.

[52] It further submits that there is no question that the records it has identified and categorized in detail in its initial submissions are in fact solicitor-client privileged. It asserts that all of them arose within the context, continuum or framework of a solicitor-client relationship, and they cannot be severed without undermining the purposes and principles the privilege exists to serve.

[53] On the issue of waiver, the university submits that it is a single institution, and that unity is not derogated from when its various employees, offices, faculties, members, research divisions, etc., must communicate and coordinate in order to (among other things) obtain legal advice. It submits that no waiver of privilege has occurred with respect to the records and parts of records at issue.

### ***Analysis and findings***

[54] I have considered the parties' representations and reviewed the 89 records that the university has withheld from the appellant in full and the 134 records that it has withheld in part. For the reasons that follow, I find that these records and parts of records are exempt from disclosure under section 49(a), read with section 19(a) of the *Act*, because they fall within the solicitor-client communication privilege aspect of

section 19(a).

[55] The records and parts of records withheld by the university are emails between staff from different areas of the university, including legal counsel, that discuss the appellant's accommodation requests. In some of these emails, university staff seek the advice of legal counsel, and in others, that legal counsel provides their legal advice. The university's legal counsel is the sender or recipient on some of these emails and is copied on others.

[56] All of these emails contain the appellant's personal information. Under section 49(a) of the *Act*, the university has the discretion to refuse to disclose the appellant's personal information in these records to him where section 19 would apply to the disclosure of that personal information.

[57] As noted above, the common law solicitor-client communication privilege aspect of section 19(a) protects direct communications of a confidential nature between lawyer and client, or their agents or employees, made for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice.<sup>22</sup> Many of the emails at issue constitute direct communications of a confidential nature between the university's legal counsel and their clients, made for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice. Others do not; for example, some of the emails are between university staff where the university's counsel is copied.

[58] However, I disagree with the appellant's argument that in the circumstances of this appeal, not every record falls within solicitor-client privilege because it is unlikely that the university communicated and sought legal advice in every email. Common law solicitor-client communication privilege covers not only the legal advice itself and the request for advice, but also communications between the lawyer and client aimed at keeping both informed so that advice can be sought and given.<sup>23</sup>

[59] In the particular circumstances of this appeal, I find, based on the specific contents of the records, that the fact that the university's legal counsel was copied on certain emails that discuss the appellant's accommodation requests constitutes communications between that legal counsel and their clients aimed at keeping both informed so that advice could be sought and given. This brings these emails within the common law solicitor-client communication privilege aspect of section 19(a).

[60] There is also no evidence before me to show that the university waived solicitor-client privilege for these emails. I do not accept that the university may have waived solicitor-client privilege by distributing them to employees not involved in discussions about how to address the appellant's accommodation requests. I agree with the university's submission that the university is a single institution for the purposes of solicitor-client privilege, and that unity is not derogated from when its various employees, offices, faculties, members or research divisions must communicate and

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<sup>22</sup> *Supra* note 13.

<sup>23</sup> *Supra* note 14.

coordinate with each other in order to obtain legal advice.

[61] In summary, I find that the records and parts of records containing the appellant's personal information that have been withheld from him by the university fall within the solicitor-client communication privilege aspect of section 19(a). As a result, they are all exempt from disclosure under section 49(a), read with section 19(a). In these circumstances, it is not necessary to determine whether they are also exempt from disclosure under section 49(a), read with section 19(c).

**C. Did the university exercise its discretion under section 49(a)? If so, should the IPC uphold the university's exercise of discretion?**

[62] The section 49(a) exemption is discretionary (the institution "may" refuse to disclose), meaning that the university can decide to disclose information even if the information qualifies for exemption. The discretionary nature of section 49(a) recognizes the special nature of requests for one's own personal information and the desire of the Legislature to give institutions the power to grant requesters access to their own personal information.<sup>24</sup> If the institution refuses to give an individual access to their own personal information under section 49(a), the institution must show that it considered whether a record should be released to the requester because the record contains their personal information.

[63] An institution must exercise its discretion. On appeal, the IPC may determine whether the institution failed to do so.

[64] In addition, the IPC may find that the institution erred in exercising its discretion where, for example,

- it does so in bad faith or for an improper purpose,
- it takes into account irrelevant considerations, or
- it fails to take into account relevant considerations.

[65] In either case, the IPC may send the matter back to the institution for an exercise of discretion based on proper considerations.<sup>25</sup> The IPC cannot, however, substitute its own discretion for that of the institution.<sup>26</sup>

[66] Some examples of relevant considerations are listed below. However, not all of these will necessarily be relevant, and additional considerations may be relevant:<sup>27</sup>

- the purposes of the *Act*, including the principles that:

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<sup>24</sup> Order M-352.

<sup>25</sup> Order MO-1573.

<sup>26</sup> Section 54(2).

<sup>27</sup> Orders P-344 and MO-1573.

- information should be available to the public,
  - individuals should have a right of access to their own personal information,
  - exemptions from the right of access should be limited and specific, and
  - the privacy of individuals should be protected,
- the wording of the exemption and the interests it seeks to protect,
  - whether the requester is seeking his or her own personal information,
  - whether the requester has a sympathetic or compelling need to receive the information,
  - whether the requester is an individual or an organization,
  - the relationship between the requester and any affected persons,
  - whether disclosure will increase public confidence in the operation of the institution,
  - the nature of the information and the extent to which it is significant and/or sensitive to the institution, the requester or any affected person,
  - the age of the information, and
  - the historic practice of the institution with respect to similar information.

***Summary of university's representations***

[67] The university submits that it only took relevant considerations into account in deciding to withhold information under section 49(a).

[68] It states that above all else, its decision was informed by the fact that there are various ongoing disputes and proceedings of an adversarial nature involving itself and the appellant, and to which the records relate. It submits that unless or until such time as all proceedings and disputes between the parties are determinatively concluded, it is reasonable for it to exercise its discretion to withhold access to the records under section 49(a).

[69] It also cites Order-3715 and submits that the importance of protecting the sanctity of the solicitor-client relationship is demonstrated in this situation, given the need to seek legal advice and the fact that the appellant has taken legal action against the university. It submits that the *Act* is not intended to offer a litigant or adversary a means by which to gain access to privileged information relating to an ongoing

proceeding or dispute.

[70] It submits, therefore, that it properly exercised its discretion under section 49(a) to withhold the records.

***Summary of appellant's representations***

[71] The appellant submits that the university did not reasonably and properly exercise its discretion in applying section 49(a) of the *Act*. He states that the primary principles that the university should have considered in exercising its discretion are that he has a right to access his own personal information, that he is seeking his own personal information and no one else's personal information, that he has a sympathetic and compelling need to receive the information, and that the information would increase public confidence in the operations of the university.

[72] The appellant also provides detailed evidence of the university's conduct towards him, which he alleges shows a reasonable apprehension of bias. He claims that this bias led the university to exercise its discretion under section 49(a) in bad faith. He further submits that the university took irrelevant considerations into account, including the fact that it believes that he would use these documents in court or a tribunal, even though he has no intention of doing so.

***Summary of university's reply representations***

[73] The university denies any apprehension of bias on its part and says the appellant advances no extrinsic evidence of bias.

***Analysis and findings***

[74] I have considered the parties' representations and for the reasons that follow, find that the university exercised its discretion under section 49(a) and did so properly in deciding to withhold 89 records in full and 134 records in part from the appellant because they are subject to solicitor-client privilege under section 19(a).

[75] On the whole, I am satisfied that the university took into account relevant considerations and no irrelevant considerations in exercising its discretion under section 49(a) to withhold the records and parts of records. I am not persuaded by the appellant's argument that the university took irrelevant considerations into account, including the fact that it believes that he would use these records in litigation before a court or a tribunal, even though he has no intention of doing so.

[76] In my view, the fact that the appellant has brought legal proceedings against the university, particularly a complaint against it with the HRTO, is a relevant factor for the university to consider in exercising its discretion under section 49(a), particularly since disclosing the records and parts of records at issue would reveal information subject to solicitor-client privilege under section 19(a). Even though the appellant claims that he

would have no intention of using such solicitor-client privileged information in other legal proceedings, the fact remains that he is the opposing party in litigation in such proceedings, and it is not unreasonable for the university to exercise its discretion to protect information subject to solicitor-client privilege under section 19(a).

[77] On the issue of bias, I am not satisfied that there was any bias on the university's part that led the university to exercise its discretion under section 49(a) in bad faith. The university disclosed to the appellant the vast majority of the records that it located in response to his nine-part access request. Out of the 1,012 records it found, it disclosed 708 records to him in full and 215 records in part. It also disclosed additional records to him at the outset of adjudication. In my view, this undermines any suggestion of bias on the university's part.

[78] I find, therefore, that the university exercised its discretion under section 49(a) and did so properly in deciding to withhold 89 records in full and 134 records in part from the appellant.

**D. Is there a compelling public interest in disclosure of the records that clearly outweighs the purpose of the section 49(a) exemption, read with section 19?**

[79] Section 23 of the *Act*, the "public interest override," provides for the disclosure of records that would otherwise be exempt under another section of the *Act*. It states:

An exemption from disclosure of a record under sections 13, 15, 15.1, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 21.1 does not apply if a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption.

[80] During mediation, the appellant claimed that the public interest override in section 23 of the *Act* applies to the records and parts of records withheld by the university. At that time, the university was withholding some information in the records and parts of records at issue under the discretionary exemption in section 13(1), which is subject to the public interest override in section 23.

[81] However, at the outset of adjudication, the university withdrew its reliance on the discretionary exemption in section 13(1).<sup>28</sup> Consequently, the only exemption that remained at issue was section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c). I have found that the 89 records that it withheld in full and the 134 records that it withheld in part are exempt from disclosure under section 19(a).

[82] Section 19 is not listed in section 23 as one of the exemptions that can be subject to the public interest override. I find, therefore, that the public interest override in section 23 cannot apply to the records and parts of records that the university has

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<sup>28</sup> The university continued to claim section 49(a), read with sections 19(a) and (c), for those parts of the records.

withheld under section 49(a), read with section 19(a).

## **OTHER ISSUES:**

[83] During the adjudication stage of this appeal, the appellant raised a constitutional issue for the first time during the processing of the appeal. He submits that the university breached his rights under sections 7 (life, liberty and security of the person), 12 (treatment or punishment) and 15 (equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law) of the *Charter* and seeks a remedy under section 24.

[84] To support his argument that the university breached his *Charter* rights, the appellant provides a chronological account of how the university processed his access request under the *Act*. He submits that the university exercised its statutory authority under the *Act* in an unlawful way and discriminatory manner, and that it infringed on his life, liberty, and security of the person. With respect to a remedy under section 24, he asks that the IPC issue one “that is appropriate.”

[85] It is clear that the IPC has the authority to decide constitutional issues, including those arising under the *Charter*.<sup>29</sup> The rules governing the raising of constitutional questions in appeals are set out in section 12 of the IPC’s *Code of Procedure* and *Practice Direction Number 9*. The latter practice direction states, in part:

### **Circumstances where notice required/to whom notice must be given**

2. Where a party intends,

(a) to raise a question about the constitutional validity or applicability of legislation, a regulation or a by-law made under legislation, or a rule of common law, or

(b) to claim a remedy under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, notice of a constitutional question shall be served on the IPC.

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<sup>29</sup> See Order PO-3686. In *Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin*, 2003 SCC 54 at para. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, in part: “Administrative tribunals which have jurisdiction — whether explicit or implied — to decide questions of law arising under a legislative provision are presumed to have concomitant jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of that provision. This presumption may only be rebutted by showing that the legislature clearly intended to exclude Charter issues from the tribunal’s authority over questions of law.” The IPC’s powers at sections 50 through 56 of the *Act* clearly include the power to decide questions of law including, for example, the interpretation and application of the exemptions at sections 12-22 and section 49, and the interpretation and application of the exclusions in section 65. There is no evidence that the legislature intended to exclude *Charter* considerations from the IPC’s mandate.



### **Time limits**

3. An appellant will be permitted to raise a constitutional question at first instance or an additional constitutional question only within a 35-day period after giving the IPC notice of his or her appeal.
4. Any other party will be permitted to raise a constitutional question only within a 35-day period after receiving notice of the appeal.
5. The Adjudicator has the discretion not to consider a constitutional question raised after the applicable time limit if the appeal proceeds to inquiry.

### **Form of notice**

6. A notice of constitutional question shall be in the form attached to this *Practice Direction*, or in a similar form that contains the same information.
7. The party raising the constitutional question shall serve notice of the constitutional question on the IPC, leaving blank the dates when the constitutional question will be argued and when the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario should notify the IPC of their intention to participate.

[86] In addition, section 12.02 of the IPC's *Code of Procedure* states that a party raising a constitutional question shall notify the IPC and the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario of the question within the applicable 35-day time period.

[87] Based on my review of the file, it does not appear that the appellant raised this constitutional issue within a 35-day period after giving the IPC notice of his appeal, as required by section 3 of *Practice Direction Number 9*. There is no reference to this constitutional issue in the appeal form that he filed with the IPC. In addition, the mediator issued a report to the parties at the end of mediation that identified the following issues in the *Act* as remaining at issue: sections 13(1), 19, 23 and 49(a). There is no reference in the mediator's report to a constitutional issue raised by the appellant as one of the issues remaining at issue.

[88] There is also no evidence in the file to show that the appellant provided the IPC with a notice of constitutional question in the form required by section 6 of *Practice Direction Number 9*, or in a similar form that contains the same information. Nor is there any evidence that he provided the Attorney Generals of Canada or Ontario with a Notice of Constitutional Question, as required by section 12.02 of the *Code*.

[89] Section 5 of *Practice Direction Number 9* provides me with the discretion not to consider a constitutional question raised after the applicable 35-day time limit. In my

view, important factors to consider in exercising my discretion in such a manner is whether the constitutional question raised by a party has a reasonable prospect of success, and whether the IPC has the jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought.

[90] Although I appreciate that the appellant believes that the university has mistreated and discriminated against him in processing his access request under the *Act*, it appears to me, without deciding the issue, that it is unlikely that the university's conduct would reach the threshold of constituting breaches of his rights under sections 7, 12 and 15 of the *Charter*. In addition, I find that the appellant's request that the IPC issue an "appropriate" remedy under section 24 of the *Charter* is vague and lacks sufficient detail.<sup>30</sup>

[91] In these circumstances, I have decided to exercise my discretion not to consider the constitutional question raised by the appellant after the applicable 35-day time limit set out in section 3 of *Practice Direction Number 9*.

## **ORDER:**

I uphold the university's decision to withhold 89 records in full and 134 records in part under section 49(a), read with section 19(a) of the *Act*. The appeal is dismissed.

Original Signed by: \_\_\_\_\_

Colin Bhattacharjee  
Adjudicator

\_\_\_\_\_  
November 29, 2022

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<sup>30</sup> My comments here are limited to this particular appeal and should not be construed as constituting an opinion or view on any other legal actions that the appellant has brought against the university, such as the discrimination complaint that he filed with the HRTO.