CYFSA DECISION 22

Complaint FA21-00028

Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society

February 26, 2025

Summary: A joint custodial parent of a four-year-old child asked for records containing his child’s personal information. The children’s aid society denied his request on the basis that, as a parent with joint custody, the complainant requires the consent of the child’s other joint custodial parent to exercise substitute decision-making authority for his son under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 .

The adjudicator upholds the decision of the children’s aid society. She finds that, as joint custodial parents, the father and the mother are equally ranked substitute decision-makers for the child under the Act; and without the mother’s consent to the father’s request, the father cannot act as an independent substitute decision-maker to request access to the child’s personal information. The adjudicator also finds that the children’s aid society appropriately considered whether the disclosure provision in section 292(1)(g) of the Act applies to permit disclosure of some information about the child to the complainant. She dismisses the complaint with no order.

Statutes Considered: Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 , SO 2017, c 14 Sch 1, sections 2(2)  (definition of “parent”), 281 (definitions of “capable” and “incapable”), 286(b), 292(1)(g), 301(2), 301(4), 303, 312(1) and 331(4)(b); Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 , SO 2004, c 3 Sch A, sections 23(1) 3, 26(1) 5, 26(5)  and 26(7) .

Decisions Considered: PHIPA Decisions 96, 107, 129 and 160.

BACKGROUND:

[1] This decision addresses how the access and discretionary disclosure provisions of Part X of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act) apply when a joint custodial parent of a child seeks access to the child’s personal information without the consent of the other joint custodial parent. It determines that, in this case, the father, as a joint custodial parent, can only exercise his substitute decision-making authority under the Act with the consent of the other joint custodial parent.

[2] The complainant is the joint custodial parent of a four-year-old child. He submitted a request to the Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society (the CAS)[1] after learning, from the CAS, that it had interacted with his child. Specifically, the complainant asked the CAS to provide “the full details of any and all cases and complaints” involving his son, including all cases and complaints that involve his child or the child’s mother, who is the other joint custodial parent for the child.[2]

[3] In response, the CAS acknowledged receipt of the complainant’s request for information regarding his child. It asked that the complainant advise of any current court proceeding, such as child protection, or custody and access proceedings, as this may affect its decision on the complainant’s request. The CAS then asked the complainant for proof of his authority as a substitute decision-maker for the child within the meaning of Part X of the Act. The CAS explained that under Part X, the complainant may request personal information on behalf of his son only if he is an authorized substitute decision-maker. It further explained that, in cases of separation or divorce, the custodial parent makes information decisions; if there are two custodial parents, they must make information decisions jointly.

[4] As evidence of his substitute decision-making authority for his child, the complainant provided the CAS with court orders confirming the custody arrangement between the complainant and the child’s mother. These orders state that the complainant and the child’s mother share joint custody of the child and have shared decision-making power for all matters affecting the child.

[5] In response, the CAS issued a decision denying the complainant access to the requested records. In its decision, the CAS stated that, because the complainant shared custody of his son with his son’s mother, it could not provide the complainant with his son’s information without the mother’s consent. The CAS enclosed an Authorization with its decision and invited the complainant to obtain the signature of the child’s mother and return the signed Authorization so that it could proceed with the complainant’s access request.

[6] The complainant was dissatisfied with the CAS’s decision and filed a complaint about it with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC). The complainant provided supporting documentation with his complaint, including the court orders mentioned above that confirm the joint custodial arrangement between him and the child’s mother.

[7] The IPC attempted to mediate the complaint. During mediation, the CAS provided a revised decision confirming its position to deny access. The revised decision noted the complainant’s shared joint custody of his son with the child's mother. It also noted the complainant’s confirmation that he was unable to obtain consent from the child's mother for the complainant’s access request. The revised decision stated that the CAS determined the complainant is not entitled to his son's personal information without the consent of his son's mother. The CAS provided reasons for its decision with specific statutory references; these are set out in more detail, below, where I describe the CAS’s representations during the review. The complainant remained dissatisfied with the CAS’s decision.

[8] A mediated resolution was not achieved, and the complaint was moved to adjudication, where an adjudicator may conduct a review. An IPC adjudicator conducted a review and obtained representations from the CAS and the complainant that she shared with the parties. The complaint was then transferred to me to continue the review.

[9] In this decision, I find that, as a joint custodial parent, the complainant cannot independently exercise substitute decision-making authority for his child to access any personal information the CAS has about his child; he must act jointly with the other joint custodial parent – the child’s mother – to access his child’s personal information under the Act as a legally authorized substitute decision-maker. I uphold the CAS’s decision and find that it properly considered the possible application of the discretionary disclosure provision in section 292(1)(g) of the Act. I do not address other concerns the complainant raised in his representations, about the CAS’s handling of his child’s matter and its alleged failure to involve him in its investigation, as those additional matters are not matters for determination by the IPC under Part X of the Act.

ISSUES:

1. Is the complainant a lawfully authorized “substitute decision-maker” for his child within the meaning of Part X?
2. Does any disclosure provision in the Act apply to the complainant’s request for his child’s personal information?

DISCUSSION:

[10] In the discussion that follows, I make no decision about whether the records sought by the complainant are records of personal information of his son that relate to the provision of a service by the CAS to his son. I only consider whether the complainant is his son’s substitute decision-maker under the Act (and thereby entitled to make an access request on his son’s behalf) and whether his request is a request for disclosure of that same information to him. Those two issues, A and B respectively, are addressed in different sections of Part X and impose different obligations on the CAS in responding to the complainant’s request.

Issue A: Is the complainant a lawfully authorized “substitute decision-maker” for his child within the meaning of Part X?

[11] With limited exceptions, section 312(1) of the Act grants an individual a right of access to a record of his own personal information that is in the custody or control of a service provider and that relates to the provision of a service to the individual. The right of access in Part X belongs only to the individual to whom the personal information relates. Part X does not grant a general right of access to another individual’s personal information.

[12] In some circumstances, a person other than the individual to whom the personal information relates may make an access request on behalf of that individual. The person making the request must be a lawfully authorized “substitute decision-maker” for the individual, who acts on the individual’s behalf (section 303[3]).

[13] Since the complainant seeks his child’s records of personal information, his request may be treated as an access request under Part X only if he is the lawfully authorized substitute decision-maker for the child. The Notice of Review sent to the parties contained the IPC adjudicator’s preliminary view that the CAS appropriately refused the complainant's request for access to his child's personal information because, although he is the child's father and has joint custody of the child, the complainant cannot act as an independent substitute decision-maker for the child in the circumstances of the complaint.

[14] The CAS asserts that the complainant cannot exercise his son’s right of access to his son’s personal information under section 312(1) of the Act as a substitute decision-maker, as permitted by sections 301(2) and 301(4) (set out below). It states that although the complainant is lawfully authorized as a substitute decision-maker for his child, he is only lawfully authorized as a joint custodian for the child; he and the child's mother share joint custody of the child and have shared decision-making power for all matters affecting the child. The CAS states that, as a result, the complainant does not enjoy an independent right of access as a substitute decision-maker under the Act to his child's personal information. The CAS submits that the child's other joint custodian, the mother of the child, will not agree to the release of the child's information.

[15] In his representations, the complainant does not directly address the statutory provisions set out below. His position is that he should be granted access to his son’s personal information because he should be privy to this information on request and should be actively involved in any investigation where his son’s information was collected or used by the CAS.

Request for another individual’s personal information – provisions of the Act concerning Access

[16] Section 301 of the Act describes persons who may act as a substitute decision-maker for an individual. It states:

(1) An individual who is capable may give, withhold or withdraw consent or may, if the individual is 16 or older, authorize in writing another individual who is 16 or older and capable to be the individual’s substitute decision-maker.

(2) If the individual is a child younger than 16, the child’s parent or a society or other person who is authorized to give, withhold or withdraw consent in the place of the parent may be the child’s substitute decision-maker unless the information relates to,

(a) treatment about which the child has made a decision in accordance with the Health Care Consent Act, 1996; or

(b) counselling to which the child has consented on their own under this Act or the old Act.

(3) If the individual is a child younger than 16 who is capable and if there is a person who is authorized to act as the substitute decision-maker of the child under subsection (2), a decision of the child to give, withhold or withdraw the consent prevails over a conflicting decision by the substitute decision-maker.

(4) Where an individual is not capable of consenting to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information, a person who would be authorized to consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information on the individual’s behalf under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004  may be the individual’s substitute decision-maker.

[17] Because the child is four years old, the complainant may act as the child’s substitute decision-maker in some circumstances. Specifically, different paragraphs of section 301 may apply to provide that a “parent” of the child may act as the child’s substitute decision-maker, depending on whether or not the child is capable of consenting within the meaning of Part X of the Act.

[18] “Capable” is defined at section 281 of the Act. To be “capable” within the meaning of Part X, an individual must be able to understand the information that is relevant to deciding whether to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, and to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of giving, withholding or withdrawing the consent. Section 281 states that “incapable” means not capable, and “incapacity” has a corresponding meaning. I have no evidence before me about the child’s capacity. However, as will be seen below, my finding is the same whether or not the child is capable.

Section 301(4) – where an individual is not capable of consenting

If the child is incapable, one joint custodial parent cannot act as a substitute decision-maker for the child over the objection of the other joint custodial parent

[19] Due to his young age, the complainant’s four-year-old child is presumably incapable: he is presumably unable to understand information relevant to deciding whether to consent to his father’s access request or to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of giving or withholding consent. If the child is incapable, then section 301(4) of the Act is engaged. It provides that a person authorized to act as a substitute decision-maker for an incapable person under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004  (PHIPA ) may act as the child’s substitute decision-maker under the Act. Section 23(1) 3 of PHIPA  states that a person who is authorized under sections 5(2) , (3)  or (4) , or under section 26  of PHIPA  may act as the child’s substitute decision-maker.

[20] Sections 5(2) , (3)  and (4)  of PHIPA  are applicable where an incapable individual already has a substitute decision-maker in relation to treatment and some other areas of decision-making under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 (and certain other conditions are met). There is no evidence that any of these sections of PHIPA  applies in the circumstances. If sections 5(2), (3) or (4) do not apply, then section 26  of PHIPA  sets out a hierarchy for determining who may act as the incapable individual’s substitute decision-maker.

[21] Section 26  of PHIPA  states, in part [emphasis added below]:

26(1) If an individual is determined to be incapable of consenting to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information by a health information custodian, a person described in one of the following paragraphs may, on the individual’s behalf and in the place of the individual, give, withhold or withdraw the consent:

1. The individual’s guardian of the person or guardian of property, if the consent relates to the guardian’s authority to make a decision on behalf of the individual.

2. The individual’s attorney for personal care or attorney for property, if the consent relates to the attorney’s authority to make a decision on behalf of the individual.

3. The individual’s representative appointed by the [Consent and Capacity Board] under section 27, if the representative has authority to give the consent.

4. The individual’s spouse or partner.

5. A child or parent of the individual, or a children’s aid society or other person who is lawfully entitled to give or refuse consent in the place of the parent. This paragraph does not include a parent who has only a right of access to the individual. If a children’s aid society or other person is lawfully entitled to consent in the place of the parent, this paragraph does not include the parent.

6. A parent of the individual with only a right of access to the individual.

7. A brother or sister of the individual.

8. Any other relative of the individual.

(2) A person described in subsection (1) may consent only if the person,

(a) is capable of consenting to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information by a health information custodian;

(b) in the case of an individual, is at least 16 years old or is the parent of the individual to whom the personal health information relates;

(c) is not prohibited by court order or separation agreement from having access to the individual to whom the personal health information relates or from giving or refusing consent on the individual’s behalf;

(d) is available; and

(e) is willing to assume the responsibility of making a decision on whether or not to consent.

(4) A person described in a paragraph of subsection (1) may consent only if no person described in an earlier paragraph meets the requirements of subsection (2).

(5) Despite subsection (4), a person described in a paragraph of subsection (1) who is present or has otherwise been contacted may consent if the person believes that,

(a) no other person described in an earlier paragraph or the same paragraph exists; or

(b) although such other person exists, the other person is not a person described in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of subsection (1) and would not object to the person who is present or has otherwise been contacted making the decision.

(7) If two or more persons who are described in the same paragraph of subsection (1) and who meet the requirements of subsection (2) disagree about whether to consent, and if their claims rank ahead of all others, the Public Guardian and Trustee may make the decision in their stead.

[22] As seen above, section 26(1)  of PHIPA  creates a hierarchy of persons who can act as a substitute decision-maker. A custodial parent is one of the persons listed in section 26(1)  of PHIPA  at paragraph 5. There is no evidence before me that there exists another person who would rank higher than a custodial parent, in the hierarchy at section 26(1)  of PHIPA , to act as a substitute decision-maker for the incapable child.

[23] The complainant and the child’s mother are joint custodial parents for the child. This means that, if the child is incapable, either the complainant or the child’s mother could act as the substitute decision-maker for the child under the Act, as a custodial parent, provided other relevant conditions are met. One of these conditions is a belief on the part of one substitute decision-maker that another equally ranked substitute decision-maker would not object (section 26(5) (b) of PHIPA ).

[24] In its representations, the CAS cites sections 301(2) and 301(4) and relies on section 26(5) (b) of PHIPA  to argue that the complainant does not have a right of access as a substitute decision-maker to the child's personal information independently, but rather, requires consent of the child's mother for such access. The CAS also believes the child’s mother does not or would not consent to the complainant’s acting as a substitute decision-maker for the child to request access to the child’s personal information. The complainant has not provided the consent of the mother or any other evidence to rebut this belief. In these circumstances, the complainant cannot claim that he is unaware of the child’s mother’s objection to his access request. In addition, it would not be reasonable for the CAS to rely on the complainant’s assertion of independent substitute decision-making authority for the child (section 331(4)(b)[4] of the Act).

[25] In his representations, the complainant argues that he should be treated as a sole custodial parent because his child’s mother cannot meaningfully act in the best interests of their child. He contends that she should not be ranked equally with him as a decision-maker on the issue of access. He explains that his child's mother was involved in the incidents that were investigated by the CAS and, therefore, she is in a conflict of interest if she is keeping information from him that could impact their son's well-being. I reject this argument from the complainant since it is not supported by the information before me.

[26] The above sections of PHIPA  – which are applicable in determining substitute decision-making authority under the Act, by virtue of section 301(4) of the Act – make clear that where equally ranked substitute decision-makers for an incapable individual do not agree, they cannot act independently of one other in respect of the individual’s personal information.

[27] Section 26(7)  of PHIPA  provides that where equally ranked substitute decision-makers for an incapable individual disagree about a request concerning that individual’s information, the Public Guardian and Trustee may make the decision in their place. There is no evidence before me that the Public Guardian and Trustee has made a decision in place of the disagreeing joint custodial parents.

[28] In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the complainant is not authorized to act as an independent substitute decision-maker for the incapable child under the Act. As a result, I find that the CAS acted appropriately in denying the complainant’s access request on the child’s behalf.

Section 301(2) – where an individual is younger than 16

One joint custodial parent cannot act as a substitute decision-maker for the child over the objection of the other joint custodial parent

[29] I reach the same conclusion when I consider section 301(2) of Part X. As will be seen below, the Act contains sections addressing substitute decision-making authority for capable individuals – including children – that, in my view, should be interpreted consistently with the sections discussed immediately above concerning incapable individuals.

[30] To begin, if the child is capable, he may make his own decision about his personal information. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the four-year-old child has made his own decision with respect to his personal information for the purposes of section 301(3) of the Act.

[31] Section 301(2) of the Act provides that the child’s “parent” may act as the child’s substitute decision-maker in relation to the child’s personal information – except where that information relates to certain treatment [section 301(2)(a)] or counselling [section 301(2)(b)], which exceptions do not apply here.

[32] “Parent,” for the purposes of the Act, is defined at section 2(2) as follows [emphasis added below]:

Unless this Act provides otherwise, a reference in this Act to a parent of a child is deemed to be a reference to,

(a) the person who has lawful custody of the child; or

(b) if more than one person has lawful custody of the child, all of the persons who have lawful custody of the child, excluding any person who is unavailable or unable to act, as the context requires.

[33] Together, sections 2(2) and 301(2) of Act make clear that in the case of a child under 16, all persons with lawful custody of the child have substitute decision-making authority for the child, with the above-noted exceptions, which do not appear to apply here.

[34] While there is no dispute that the complainant and the child’s mother are joint custodial parents of the child, the CAS states that it believes the child’s mother does not, or would not, consent to the complainant’s request for access to the child’s personal information as a substitute decision-maker.

[35] Unlike in the above-noted sections of PHIPA  addressing substitute decision-making authority for incapable individuals – incorporated into the Act by virtue of section 301(4) of the Act – neither the Act nor PHIPA  explicitly addresses situations where equally ranked substitute decision-makers for a child disagree.

[36] However, as noted by the CAS in its decision to the complainant, the IPC has addressed this type of situation in the context of PHIPA . Like the Act, PHIPA  provides a right of individuals, or their lawfully authorized substitute decision-makers, to access records of their own information and sets out rules around who may act as substitute decision-makers for the individuals.

[37] In PHIPA Decisions 107, 129,[5] and 160, the IPC considered situations where equally ranked substitute decision-makers (joint custodial parents) for children disagreed about the exercise of their decision-making authority on behalf of the children. The complainant argues that these PHIPA  decisions, which were noted in the Notice of Review he received, are not relevant and should be distinguished because he is not requesting personal health information. I disagree. I consider the three PHIPA  decisions instructive, as explained below.

[38] In PHIPA Decisions 107, 129 and 160, the IPC concluded that where the equally ranked substitute decision-makers of a child disagree, neither substitute decision-maker can act independently of the other in respect of the request. This is based on a purposive reading of section 23  of PHIPA  (which identifies persons who may act as substitute decision-makers under PHIPA ) and other sections of PHIPA , which would apply an analogous condition (to that set out in section 26  of PHIPA ) on the ability of equally ranked substitute decision-makers to act independently of one another where there is conflict between them.

[39] In my view, the same approach applies in the context of the Act. Section 23  of PHIPA  is similar in relevant respects to section 301 of the Act, which describes persons who may act as a substitute decision-maker for an individual. Specifically, the provisions in both acts address in a similar way the substitute decision-making authority for incapable individuals, and for capable individuals under the age of 16.

[40] I find further support for this approach in the Act’s definition of “parent,” in section 2(2) of the Act, which specifies that this term applies to all persons with lawful custody of a child. Arguably, this section goes further than PHIPA  in indicating that in cases of shared custody, joint custodial parents have shared substitute decision-making authority and, thus, must agree on a request in respect of a child’s personal information.

[41] Regarding his status as parent with shared custody of his child, and the definition of “parent of a child” in section 2(2) of the Act, the complainant argues he should be treated as a sole custodian because, he contends, his child’s mother cannot meaningfully act in the best interests of their child. The complainant relies on paragraph (b) of the definition of in section 2(2) that permits the exclusion of any parent (where more than one person has lawful custody of the child) “who is unavailable or unable to act.” However, the complainant provides only his unsupported contention on this point. There is nothing before me to indicate that the mother of the child is either unavailable or unable to act. What is before me is the complainant’s confirmation to the CAS that he was unable to obtain the child’s mother’s consent, and the CAS’s submission that the other joint custodial parent does not or would not agree to the complainant’s request for access to records of the child’s personal information. As above, in these circumstances, it would not be reasonable for the CAS to rely on the complainant’s assertion of independent substitute decision-making authority for the child [section 331(4)(b) of the Act].

[42] Accordingly, I find that the CAS acted appropriately in refusing the complainant’s request for access to records of his child’s personal information. Although the complainant is the child’s father and has joint custody of the child, he cannot act as an independent substitute decision-maker for the child in the circumstances of the complaint.

Issue B: Does any disclosure provision in the Act apply to the complainant’s request for personal information relating to his child?

[43] “Disclosure” is not a defined term in the Act. However, the IPC has noted that the term generally refers to releasing information or making information available to another person or organization.[6] The disclosure provisions in the Act may apply to permit or require a service provider to release records of personal information to a person other than the individual to whom that information relates.

[44] Section 286 addresses the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by a service provider for the purpose of providing a service to an individual. It states:

A service provider shall not collect personal information about an individual for the purpose of providing a service or use or disclose that information unless,

(a) the service provider has the individual’s consent under this Act and the collection, use or disclosure, to the best of the service provider’s knowledge, is necessary for a lawful purpose; or

(b) the collection, use or disclosure without the individual’s consent is permitted or required by this Act.

[45] There is no suggestion that the child consents and, as discussed above, I find that the complainant cannot act as the child’s substitute decision-maker to provide that consent. Accordingly, I do not consider section 286(a) of the Act.

Disclosure without consent

[46] Section 286(b) contemplates disclosure where other sections of the Act permit or require a service provider to disclose personal information relating to the provision of a service to an individual. These are found at sections 292 to 294 of the Act. In the circumstances, the only potentially relevant provisions are found in section 292 of the Act.[7]

[47] As noted above, during the request and complaint process, the complainant identified reasons why he believes he has a right to the information he seeks. For example, he cited his court orders as a legal authority for him to obtain his son’s personal information. He also explained that he has concerns about the safety and well-being of his child. Accordingly, section 292(1)(g) of the Act is a potentially relevant discretionary disclosure provision in this complaint.

[48] Section 292(1)(g) states:

(1) A service provider may, without the consent of the individual, disclose personal information about an individual that has been collected for the purpose of providing a service,

(g) if the service provider believes on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is necessary to assess, reduce or eliminate a risk of serious harm to a person or group of persons[.]

[49] In PHIPA Decision 96, the IPC considered a father’s request under PHIPA  for information about services his children may have received from a health information custodian. In that decision, the IPC found that the father did not have a right of access under PHIPA  to records of his children’s personal health information. However, the IPC found that the father had provided grounds for the custodian to consider his request under several sections in PHIPA  that confer discretion on the custodian to disclose personal health information. The IPC found that, in those circumstances, the custodian had a duty to consider the request under those relevant disclosure provisions, and that the custodian had failed to do so. The IPC ordered the custodian to exercise its discretion under those discretionary provisions of PHIPA  permitting disclosure. The IPC also provided guidance on relevant factors that may inform the custodian’s exercise of discretion.

The parties’ representations

[50] The CAS states that it considered sections 292 to 294 of the Act and disclosed to the complainant information in accordance with those sections. It explains that it exercised its discretion properly in deciding to disclose some information to the complainant about the referral it received and the investigation that ensued. The CAS states that it advised the complainant that there were no immediate concerns regarding his son’s safety and well-being. It explains that the referral it received concerned the safety of a third party other than the complainant’s child. It further explains that, among other reasons, it did not provide additional information to the complainant in order to protect the personal information of others, including that third party.

[51] The complainant asserts that the CAS should have contacted him about any investigation involving his son, in accordance with the requirement at section 292(1)(d) of the Act (which permits disclosure for the purpose of contacting a family member where an individual is injured, incapacitated or otherwise not capable), since he has joint custody of his son. The complainant submits that if his son's safety was in question at any point, he should be granted access to that relevant information. The complainant says that if the CAS, as a service provider focused on the well-being of children, assured him in writing that it has no concerns about his child's physical and mental health and safety in relation to the incidents he believes occurred then his access request would be moot. He says the only goal of his request is to ensure that his son is healthy and safe.

[52] In response to the complainant's representations, the CAS accepts that the complainant’s request and representations raise the potential application of section 292(1)(g) of the Act permitting disclosure without consent. It states that it considered the complainant’s request in accordance with section 292(1)(g), which is the only applicable disclosure without consent provision. The CAS states that it understands that it has an obligation to continually consider the disclosure provisions of the Act, especially where there is a need to assess, reduce or eliminate a risk of serious harm to a person, or otherwise fulfill its mandate as a children's aid society. It states that it exercised its discretion properly under section 292(1)(g). The CAS confirms that it did not establish that there was a risk of harm to the child that could be assessed, reduced or eliminated by disclosing personal information to the complainant without consent. It states that it did not establish that disclosure of personal information to the complainant without consent was permitted or required by law, and it did not establish that any other section of the Act applied such that a disclosure of personal information to the complainant without consent was permitted.

[53] The CAS asserts that it has no “cases or complaints” related to the complainant's child and that the “cases or complaints” the complainant is asking about relate to third parties. It states that it could not establish that an imminent risk of harm to the child, beyond the merely possible or speculative, existed that would allow for a service to the child or disclosure to the complainant without consent under section 292(1)(g). As such, it states that there was no investigation or interaction related to the child in which personal information related to services provided by the CAS was collected. The CAS submits that considering the foregoing, it disclosed to the complainant all the information that it could disclose without consent, which, in May 2021, was that the child was seen and assessed by a CAS worker regarding the concerns shared with the CAS and no concerns for the child's care were found. The CAS confirms that, in its opinion, nothing has changed since May 2021 that would allow for disclosure without consent under section 292(1)(g) of the Act or any other section. The CAS also provides confidential representations on this issue.

[54] The complainant disputes the CAS's submission that it considered his request under section 292(1)(g); he asserts that the CAS did not previously reference that section of the Act. The complainant states that the CAS did not disclose information about his son to him; he was made indirectly aware of his son’s involvement with the CAS due to the “screener” referring him to the “active case worker involving [his] son.”

Analysis and finding

[55] Having considered the parties’ representations and the information the CAS provided to the complainant, I am satisfied that the CAS properly considered the complainant’s request under section 292(1)(g), which is the only potentially applicable section of the Act permitting disclosure without consent.

[56] I also accept the CAS’s confirmation in its representations that it determined at the time that it contacted the complainant that it had no concern about his child’s safety and well-being. Having accepted this confirmation from the CAS of the child’s safety and well-being, I reject the complainant’s argument that section 292(1)(d) of the Act is applicable. The complainant is the only one suggesting that there is any concern for his child’s safety or well-being; this is despite the CAS’s repeatedly advising him, throughout this complaint, that it did not and does not have any concerns about the child’s safety and well-being. I note that the complainant’s representations state that, if he were to receive written confirmation from the CAS that there is no concern about his child’s safety and well-being, he will be satisfied. The complainant has received that written confirmation.

[57] For the foregoing reasons, I uphold the CAS’s decision and dismiss this complaint.

NO ORDER:

I make no order for the reasons set out above, which I provide in satisfaction of the requirement in section 321(4) of the Act.

 

Original Signed by:		February 26, 2025
Stella Ball
Adjudicator